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INTRODUCrION
Environmental pollution often poses serious risks to future
generations.1 Markets primarily reflect the preferences of cur-
rent consumers, may not properly discount the value of alterna-
tive future uses, and therefore, may not adequately internalize
the intergenerational social costs of long-term ecological or cul-
tural harm.2 Structural political failure occurs as well because fu-
1 See generally EirH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERA-
"IONS: INTERNATIONAL LA-W, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTEROENERA-
TIONAL EQUITY 2, 5-28, 34-40, 44 passim (1989) (discussing intergenerational
equity); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Fu-
ture: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L
REv. 267 (1993) (discussing problems of discount rates and intergenerational
effects); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, A Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come: Stand-
ing to Sue for Future Generations, 1 J.L. & TECH. 67 (1986) (discussing the use
of a "posterity suit" as a means of protecting the interest of future generations
in the environment).
2 See CASS P, StuNSTEiN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEmVING
THE REGULATORY STATE 68 (1990) (noting that markets reflect current prefer-
ences and therefore may create a kind of externality for future generations);
Gordon Christenson, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law,
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ture generations cannot vote in today's elections. As a result, the
political market is potentially even more unfair to future genera-
tions than the economic market.3 In general, current environ-
mental statutes do not adequately address the impact of today's
pollution on future generations.4
Although some critics argue that the present generation
owes no duties to its descendants, there are important moral rea-
sons to protect the future., In the case of some problems such as
global warming, the government should plan as far as one hun-
dred years in the future, even if there is little popular interest in
these issues.
A crucial issue is deciding whether social institutions are
best equipped to protect future generations at an acceptable
cost.5 No institution is perfect at addressing any complex social
problem, and therefore, one must assess the relative institutional
competence of several institutions to determine which is most ef-
fective.6 This Article, however, suggests how a relatively in-
dependent executive agency might lead efforts to protect the
future.
Neither Congress nor the Executive Office of the President
is well suited to protect future generations because each is pri-
marily interested in representing today's voters. By their very
nature, democratic institutions are biased in favor of current vot-
ers. Traditionally, courts have served the countermajoritarian
function in our society, but judges generally lack the substantive
expertise to address questions at the frontiers of science.
Currently, agencies generally focus on short-term problems
because of statutory deadlines and a lack of adequate resources
Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 392,
395-96 (1990) (markets may fail to internalize intertemporal social costs). Put
see Stephen F. Williams, Background Norms in the Regulatory State, 58 U. Cml.
L. REv. 419, 431 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTmR "mE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (1990)) (arguing that matkets do take into account preferences of
future generations in discounted current value, but conceding the possibility
that market discount rates are either unethically or inefficiently high).
3 Williams, supra note 2, at 431 (arguing future generations have less influ-
ence in political markets than in economic markets because they have no vote).
4 ST]INSTmIN, supra note 2, at 104 (noting statutes protecting future genera-
tions are often inadequately implemented).
5 Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995
Wis. L. Rv. 463, 469 (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTnRNA.
TIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1994)).
6 See generally KOMESAR, supra note 5, at 3-10; Rubin, supra note 5, at 464.
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for addressing long-term problems. There is also insufficient co-
ordination of different agencies with overlapping agendas. Fur-
thermore, the quality of environmental staffs and decisionmaking
could be improved. Finally, agencies need more independence to
reallocate resources from low to high priority issues.
As part of a larger debate about "civic republicanism," there
has been a more specific discussion about the extent to which
agencies play a positive role in improving democratic politics. At
their best, agencies can play a constructive role in fostering dem-
ocratic deliberation and participation regarding complex risk is-
sues, especially those affecting future generations. To do so
effectively, agencies should endeavor to achieve a careful synthe-
sis of technical expertise and sensitivity to popular values. This
Article proposes that Congress create and delegate considerable
authority to a "Superagency" to review all regulations that may
have a significant impact on future generations and to coordinate
existing agencies. The Superagency could help future genera-
tions simply by putting their concerns high on the regulatory
agenda 7 In addition, it would be given paternalistic discretion to
promote the best interests of future generations. Occasionally, it
might use its discretion to act in a countermajoritarian way, but
would primarily try to promote democratic deliberation and par-
ticipation regarding issues involving future generations.
Is the proposal politically feasible? The Superagency would
be potentially palatable to both the President and Congress be-
cause neither branch would gain or lose too much authority. Be-
cause predicting future environmental consequences involves
substantial technical and political uncertainties, long-term envi-
ronmental policymaking is the type of issue that Congress might
be willing to delegate to an administrative agency. For the Presi-
dent, there would be a tradeoff between more effective coordina-
tion of environmental policy and accepting a greater degree of
agency independence. The circulation of the Superagency's staff
among both branches may win support from both sides.
Part I of this Article introduces the principle that the present
generation owes duties to future generations. Part II argues that
7 The control of agendas can have a significant impact in the legislative or
regulatory decisionmaking process. See Eric J. Gouvin, Review Essay: A
Square Peg in a Vicious Circle." Stephen Breyer's Optimistic Prescription for the
Regulatory Mess, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 473, 476 (1995) (citing sources); see
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHiLiP P. F.xciEY, LAW AND PUBuc CHoIcE:
A CRMCAL INRODUCriON 38-42 (1991).
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current environmental laws fail future generations. Part III ar-
gues that neither Congress nor the executive branch can protect
future generations from environmental harms due to short-term
political pressures. Part IV evaluates the current capabilities of
agencies to plan for long-term environmental problems. Part V
evaluates whether agencies may be capable of better long-term
planning by creating a dialogue with the public. Part VI pro-
poses a Superagency to protect the environmental interests of fu-
ture generations. The Superagency would be independent of
Congress and the executive branch and be allowed a measure of
limited paternalism to protect future generations, tempered by a
requirement to foster public sensitivity to future needs.
I
SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT =H FuTuRE? WILL WE CARE?
Commentators have disagreed about whether the present
generation owes duties to future generations, and how far into
the future those obligations extend. Those who strongly believe
that we owe obligations to the future often pose the question of
what we would want the present generation to do if we stood in
the shoes of some future unborn generation. These same people
frequently propose that the present generation has a fiduciary
responsibility to see that future generations enjoy a parity of so-
cial value and opportunity.8
Commentators who argue that society owes no obligations
to the future make two major arguments. First, there is the epis-
temological objection that the present generation cannot know
either the value preferences of future generations or predict the
physical conditions in which they will live, especially far into the
future.9 While there is some truth to the epistemological objec-
s See generally BRucE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
203 (1980) (arguing that people alive today should have no priority over the
unborn because "all citizens are at least as good as one another regardless of
their date of birth"); JOHN RATEs, A THEORY OF JUSnCs 284-93 (1971) (argu-
ing that each generation should set aside some capital for future generations
until just institutions are firmly established and suggesting that the temporal
priority of people alive today yields them no moral priority); MARK SAaOFF,
THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 63
(1988) (citation omitted) ("Our obligation to provide future individuals with an
environment consistent with ideals we know to be good is an obligation not
necessarily to those individuals but to the ideals themselves.").
9 See generally FERNAND BRAUDEL, ON HISTORY (S. Mathews trans., 1980)
(doubting a given science could predict historically into the future); Christopher
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tion, that argument is weaker when we are concerned with mak-
ing decisions that affect only those living one or two generations
into the future.' 0 Furthermore, there are some values such as
preserving human health, species diversity, and natural beauty
that are unlikely to change, at least in the near future."1
The second objection to planning for the future is ontologi-
cal. Because future generations do not yet exist, the present gen-
eration cannot be statutorily or morally obligated to act upon
their behalf.U In particular, because our actions in pursuing one
policy over another determine the composition of any future gen-
eration, it is pointless to act for any future generations' benefit.13
That argument ignores, however, our ability to benefit a future
generation regardless of which specific individuals comprise it.14
Furthermore, because our choices about consumption and the
environment will in fact determine, at least in part, both who viU
live in the future and what values they will hold, we bear a heavy
responsibility to make the human race better, not even worse,
than it already is.15 It is possible to avoid the ontological argu-
ment if we owe a duty to act responsibly not to our descendants,
but to all species and the environment in general.16
D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming, 86 AM. J. IN-'L L
445 (1992). Stone writes:
One answer is that it is almost fatuous to worry about how people will live
ninety years from now-in particular, to presume what their prime con-
cerns will be-in light of technologies and tastes and intervening disrup-
tions we can only surmise, from fusion and superconductivity to meteors.
How accurately could those living in 1900 have predicted and provided
for the problems that face us?
Id. at 447-48.
10 Jeffrey Spear, Comment, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Re-
sponsibilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L. 117, 124, 128 (1993).
11 Id. at 124, 129-30.
12 Id. at 124-25.
13 Anthony D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve
the Global Environment?, 84 Am. J. Ir'L L. 190, 190-92 (1990) (arguing that
society does not owe a duty to the future because our very act of discharging
that duty wipes out the very individuals to whom we allegedly owed that duty);
see also Spear, supra note 10, at 125-26 (summarizing the ontological
objection).
14 Spear, supra note 10, at 125-26. But see D'Amato, supra note 13, at 194
(arguing that the fact that we can benefit a generic future generation rather
than any specific individual glosses over the fact that future generations are not
an abstraction).
15 SAGOFF, supra note 8, at 61-63.
16 D'Amato, supra note 13, at 197-98.
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Some commentators take a pragmatic view based upon how
people generally treat their children and grandchildren and con-
tend that the current generation does not bear a fiduciary duty to
Maximize the income of or to preserve the entire corpus for fu-
ture generations, but simply to act responsibly and not to impose
undue hardships on their own descendants.17 This Article agrees
that the present generation owes special obligations to our chil-
dren and grandchildren, but would also take reasonably cost-ef-
fective steps to protect more distant generations to the extent
that society can reasonably make predictions, perhaps 100 years
into the future.
The present generation should not make sacrifices to mar-
ginally improve the lives of distant future generations, but should
try to avoid creating substantial risks of future disaster.18 The
question is which institutions are capable of protecting those who
will live in the year 2100.
II
CuRRENT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FAILs THE FuTuRE
A. Defining Intergenerational Environmental Equity
Because future generations are not represented in making
decisions today, the present generation may either choose to
benefit from the depletion of nonrenewable resources and elimi-
nation of renewable resources at the expense of future genera-
tions, or to take actions which benefit future generations. 19
1. Depletion of Resources
There are at least three ways in which the present generation
may deplete resources, often with irreversible consequences, and
thereby come into conflict with the interests of future genera-
17 Members of the current generation are probably unwilling to make
greater sacrifices for anonymous members of future generations than for their
own personal descendants. See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 294-
95. Because the present generation is in a better position to know and to shape
* the preferences of their children and grandchildren, society arguably owes a
greater obligation to its children and grandchildren than to more distant gener-
ations. Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 295.
18 Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 294-95.
19 See WEIss, supra note 1, at 5. Recently, much attention has been paid to
the need to preserve biological diversity. See generally Christopher D. Stone,
What To Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth's
Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577 (1995).
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tions:2o first, by depleting higher quality resources, leading to
higher real prices of resources for future generations; second, by
consuming potentially valuable resources;21 and third, by ex-
hausting resources, resulting in the narrowing of the range of
available natural resources.
Some economists would argue against the possibility of a
rise in real prices of natural resources on the grounds that society
has an infinite capacity to substitute resources or to improve ex-
traction technology, or postulate that higher prices for resources
can be met by the greater wealth generated from the present con-
sumption of resources.2
However, it is questionable whether future generations will
be able to find alternative energy supplies at real prices compara-
ble to oil and gas today, or to discover inexpensive alternatives
for products derived from species of plants and animals that are
becoming extinct.P If we assume that the real price of a given
natural resource will increase in the future, there is no guarantee
that future generations will inherit sufficient wealth, capital, or
technology to offset increases in the price of natural resources
relative to other items.24 For biological resources such as mam-
mals, portfolios of germplasm, or marine resources of the global
commons areas, there are serious market failure problems. A
non-eliminable public good problem results from these assets be-
ing underpriced, altogether unpriced, or even subsidized out of
existence, at tremendous potential loss to future generations.25
Finally, the loss of species and natural or cultural resources may
pose both economic and intangible losses to future generations 2 6
20 WEIss, supra note 1, at 6-9.
21 An example is the current exploitation of natural gas reserves containing
helium, a potentially valuable resource, which is simply released into the air.
WEIss, supra note 1, at 8.
22 If a rise in real prices occurs, these economists would contend that the
increase results from higher labor costs or costs of other factors in the produc-
tion process. WEiss, supra note 1, at 6.
23 WEIss, supra note 1, at 6-7.
24 WEiss, supra note 1, at 6-7.
25 See Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation,
Market Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CoNr*. L. REv. 365 (1995)
(arguing it is essentially impossible to put a price on the value of environment
and that restoration to status quo ante is morally required).
26 See SAGOFF, supra note 8, at 60-65; WEISS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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2. Degradation in Environmental Quality
The present generation's degradation of the natural environ-
ment will often dauiage its utility for future generations because
it frequently takes a long time for natural or even man-made
processes to restore the environment.27 Most notably, global
warming resulting from the increasing concentration of green-
house gases that trap heat, such as carbon dioxide and methane,
may have long-term impacts.28 Other types of pollution may
have less dramatic, but still significant, impacts on future genera-
tions by preventing the use of lakes for swimming or drinking,
destroying or diminishing certain species of animals or plants, er-
oding soils, or by degrading cultural resources such as historic
buildings.29 To a considerable extent, however, degradation of
the environment is caused by the growth of the world's popula-
tion. Future generations might prefer to live in a degraded envi-
ronment rather than to exist in smaller numbers in a pristine
one.30
3. Distributional Consequences
In a nation and a world in which there are enormous dispari-
ties in income, either the consumption of resources or their
preservation is likely to have important distributional conse-
quences.31 Those who benefit from consumption often exter-
nalize the cost by placing it on future generations.32 On the
other hand, the preservation of resources for the future may be
unfair to those people who 'currently live in extreme poverty, es-
pecially if some nations or individuals will inherit more than
others.33
27 WEISS, supra note 1, at 9-10.
28 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 28 (1993) (arguing
government should spend "more time and effort on more serious problems such
as ozone, forest destruction, or climate change"); WEISS, supra note 1, at 10-11.
But see Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 449, 466-67
(1995) (arguing that there are many uncertainties about the seriousness of
ozone depletion, forest destruction, or global warming, and that adaptation to,
in addition to prevention of, climate change should be considered).
29 See WEISS, supra note 1, at 11-13.
30 See generally D'Amato, supra note 13, at 193-94.,
31 See generally Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discrimina-
tory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHo
ST. LJ. 329, 334-35 (1995).
32 WEISS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
33 See WEISS, supra note 1, at 14.
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B. Current Environmental Laws Fail the Future
Many environmental statutes do not address whether EPA
should consider the impacts of pollution on future generations.
Those-that do usually fail to provide sufficient guidance to the
agency regarding how to allocate resources between programs
that primarily reduce pollution in the short run and those that
might provide greater long-term benefits to future generations? 4
Furthermore, it is difficult for EPA to engage in long-term plan-
ning, set priorities, or reallocate resources. That agency must im-
plement several dozen separate statutes, enacted by Congress at
different times, with different criteria, and different procedures
for setting standards.35
For example, because the provisions in the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)36 regarding the rights of
future generations are purely procedural, EPA lacks any substan-
tive power to protect those rights.37 Similarly, government ap-
pointed trustees should protect or conserve environmental
resources for future generations,38 but both the Oil Pollution
34 See generally MARY R. ENGLISH, SrrnrG Low-LFvE RADIOACTIVE
WASTE DisposAL FACILTES 73-76 (discussing fiduciary responsibility of siting
boards).
35 Richard N. L. Andrews, Long-Range Planning in Environmental and
Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 538 (1993); Lakshman
Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental
Mind?, 1989 Wis. L REv. 463, 463-69 passim.
36 NEPA declares that, "it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential consid-
erations of national policy, to [ensure] ... that the Nation may ... fulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1994).
37 See generally Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (citation omitted) ("Once an agency has made a deci-
sion subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to
ensure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it can-
not 'interject itself vithin the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice
of the action to be taken."'); William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's Prom-
ise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental
Policy, 64 IND. LJ. 205, 243-45 (1989) (discussing cases holding that NEPA is
only procedural); Philip Weinberg, It's Tune to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3
N.Y.U. ENvrL LJ. 99 (1994) (discussing cases holding NEPA is only proce-
dural and arguing Congress intended NEPA to have substantive consequences).
38 See generally Gerald M. Levine, The Rhetoric of Public Expectation: An
Enquiry into the Concepts of Responsiveness and Responsibility Under the Envi-
ronmental Laws, 8 PACE ENvri- L. REv. 389, 414-16 (1991) (discussing trustee
provision in NEPA); see generally Timothy Patrick Brady, Comment, "But Most
of It Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born." The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and
the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENvi.. ApF. L. REv. 621,643-46 (1990) (arguing
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Act39 and the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)4° fail to specify how
trustees-should spend recovered damages from claims to com-
pensate for harm to natural resources in the future or where to
keep the money in the interim.41
Questions involving protection of future generations are not
merely academic or speculative, but create difficult policy choices
for agencies. For instance, in a recent study of Superfund sites,
Professors James Hamilt6n and W. K. Viscusi found that "future
risks account[ed] for over 90% of all the risk-weighted pathways
-for the Superfund sites in our sample. Chief among these future
risks is the projection that future residents will reside on sites
that are not currently residential. 42 Hamilton and Viscusi argue
that many of these risks could be eliminated by land-use restric-
tions preventing residential use of highly polluted sites and con-
tainment, including fences, but that "these strategies would
require a change in EPA's current legislative mandate establish-
ing a preference for long-term effectiveness and permanence in
remedy selection. ' 43 In 1994, proposed legislation would have
allowed EPA to take into account the likely future use of a site,
whether residential or industrial, and 'would have established
Community Working Groups of up to twenty representatives to
advise EPA on land use recommendations affecting future use.44
Recently proposed legislation, however, failed to address who
should represent the interests of future generations.45 Some ex-
isting plans for cleaning up contaminated sites include recom-
NEPA has failed to incorporate public trust doctrine and is inadequate to pro-
tect future generations).
39 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (1994); see generally Symposium, Oil Pollution Act
Rulemaking, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (1993).
40 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1994).
41 See generally Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Re-
source Damdges Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine Into Nat-
ural Resources Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 353 (1992); Andrew J.
Simons & James M. Wick, Natural Resources Damages Under CERCLA: Here
They Come, Ready or Not, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 801 (1989).
42 James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for
Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 608 (1994).
43 ld. at 609.
44 H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102(g), 502(2) (1994) (stating that
community working groups reasonably anticipated future uses of land); see
Douglas A. McWilliams, Comment, Environmental Justice and Industrial Rede-
velopment" Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECoLOoY L.Q.
705, 774-75 (1994) (discussing community work group proposal).
45 See Mank, supra note 31, at 414-18.
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mendations on future use, but there are no systematic standards
for addressing such issues. 6
There are a number of possible ways to protect future gener-
ations from the potential harms of, for example, a closed hazard-
ous waste dump. To protect residents after a facility is closed, a
developer could create an ex post trust fund or put up a bond to
address future issues resulting from eventual closure of the site
such as post-closure monitoring or the implementation of institu-
tional controls including signs, a fence, or local land-use regula-
tions.47 There is evidence, however, that current financial
responsibility regulations for hazardous waste operators are in-
adequate 4s Perhaps the underlying reason for the inadequacy of
these regulations is that future generations have no representa-
tion when regulations are written and must rely upon the good
will of busy civil servants who face political pressures from the
interests of the present generation.
Currently, environmental statutes and regulations pay lip
service to the need to protect future generations, but are often
too vague or weak to have much impact. Theoretically, Congress
or existing agencies could simply write more detailed statutes or
regulations addressing the needs of future generations, but such
reforms are not likely until there are better institutional mecha-
nisms to represent our descendants.
THE THRBE BRANCHES CANNOT PROTECt THE FUTURE
Both Congress49 and the Executive Office of the President
do not tend to spend much time on long-term planning. Tradi-
tionally, courts have served the countermajoritarian function in
our society, but judges generally lack the substantive expertise to
address questions at the frontiers of science, and judicial review
46 See generally THE FERNALD CITIZNS TASK FORCE, RECOMIENDATIONS
ON REMEDIATION LEVELS, WASTE DISPOSTION, PRIORES, AND FuTuRE UsE
45-48 (July 1995) (recommending that at former uranium processing plant, resi-
dential and agricultural uses be avoided in future; however, other uses should
be considered if there is a sufficient buffer between the on-site disposal cell and
any other uses of the property).
47 Owners of hazardous waste facilities must set aside enough resources to
assure site safety after closure for thirty years. 40 C.F.R. § 264.117(a)(1) (1995).
48 See, e.g., supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
49 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of
Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DuKE L. 1180,
1187 (1994) (arguing that "the legislature tends to have a short time horizon").
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often results in too much concern with proceduralism at the ex-
pense of substance.
A. Congress Cannot Write Long-Term Statutes
A number of commentators have criticized the role Con-
gress plays in setting regulatory priorities.50 As one critic noted,
"Congress seldom legislates in a systematic, multi-agency, multi-
issue way; it rarely deals with the subject of regulation writ
large."'' s Other critics have argued that Congress acts at the be-
hest of special interests and pushes EPA to adopt ineffective or
wasteful programs.52 While the electoral process endows Con-
gress with a greater degree of democratic legitimacy than admin-
istrative agencies, some commentators argue that agencies can
allow broader participation by interested parties other than Con-
gress, and that the Administrator of EPA is more accountable to
the public than most individual members or even committees of
Congress.
53
50 Id. at 1184 (stating that "Congress's weaknesses as an instrument for com-
prehensive regulatory reform are manifold"); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture
Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REv.
1, 5-12 (1994) (citing and discussing numerous articles critical of congressional
oversight of administrative agencies).
51 Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1186.
52 See Andrews, supra note 97, at 545 (citing sources); Steven J. Groseclose,
Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions From an Empirical Study of
EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REv.521, 533(1994) (writing that Congressional pressure "distorts priorities and prevents re-
alistic agenda setting and deadline compliance"). But see generally Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv.
873, 895-98 & nn.147-52 (reviewing empirical studies of legislative process and
concluding that serving special interest groups is only a partial explanation of
legislation); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureau.
cratic State, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1524-25 (1992).
53 Committee influence over agency policy may not reflect the desires of the
entire Congress, especially because members of Congress are often assigned to
particular committees because their district has a special interest in the commit-
tee's subject matter. See Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 11-12; Sidney A. Shapiro,
Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMN. L.
REv. 1 (1994). Some commentators argue that delegation of political authority
to administrative agencies can actually improve the responsiveness of govern-
ment to the desires of the electorate because administrators and ultimately the
President are more accountable than individual members of Congress or con-
gressional subcommittees. See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regu-
latory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"
Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1300 & n.65 (1985) (stating that
agencies are more accountable to public than individual members of Congress
or committees); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L.
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Congress faces special difficulty setting coherent environ-
mental policies and especially in revising them in a timely fashion
as circumstances change.54 Because Congress enacts one statute
at a time, and writes statutes in different subcommittees with
overlapping jurisdiction, the institution cannot easily coordinate
potentially overlapping provisions in different statutes.55
As a practical matter, Congress leaves much decisionmaking
to agencies.56 The fragmented congressional committee system
and other structural constraints make it difficult for Congress to
perform long-term planning or to guide how agencies conduct
research and priority-setting. Theoretically, Congress might
overcome these structural problems by creating a general com-
mittee for overseeing the regulatory process, by developing a
regulatory budget that limits the cost of regulation, or by estab-
lishing a permanent staff assigned to the task of evaluating regu-
latory programs 5 7 Congressional fragmentation itself renders
'the possible implementation of such measures unlikely; individ-
ual committees or members are unlikely to cede such authority
to a centralized body.
Congress could use legislatively imposed procedural con-
straints to control agencies 58 However, the Supreme Court's de-
RPv. 323, 331 (1987) (eliminating administrative delegation would likely result
in Congress "subdelegating the legislation function to congressional committees
or subcommittees whose decisions would in most cases be ratified with little or
no review by the entire Congress"). But see. Bradford C. Mank, What Comes
After Technology: Using an "Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk
Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENvMt . . 263, 303-09(1994) (arguing that society is better off when Congress as a whole enacts legis-
lation providing clear direction for an agency's exercise of discretion).
54 See Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1188; Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 6-12.
55 See BRiEsni, supra note 28, at 42; see generally Lakshman Guruswamy,
Integrating Thoughtways: Re-opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L
REv. 463, 463-69 passim (arguing that environmental statutes tend to focus on
one type of pollution problem and ignore the interrelated nature of pollution
problems).
56 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (arguing broad delegation
of power to agencies is more efficient than use of overly detailed and restrictive
statutory rules).
57 See SuNsrEn, supra note 2, at 108.
58 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Separated Powers and Positive
Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEo. LJ.
671, 673 (1992) (arguing that Congress can design and structure agency to gen-
erate decisions reflecting original understanding of enacting coalition); Mat-
thew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L REv.
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cisions in INS v.Chadha,59 invalidating a one-House legislative
veto, and in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,60 emphasizing judicial deference to agency interpreta-.
tions of statutes, make it more difficult for Congress to use pro-
cedural mechanisms to control agencies. 61 Congress has used
procedural rules in statutes with only moderate success to control
the actions of agencies. 62 Congressional control over the budget
and confirmation process, however, gives Congress significant
opportunities to influence agencies. 63
Current congressional attempts to use procedural rules to
dictate policy results would unduly restrict agency discretion.
The present Congress is considering a number of "regulatory re-
form" bills that would require agencies to subject proposed rules
and perhaps existing rules to analytical and procedural require-
ments, especially cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments. 64
These bills represent a way for Congress to undertake broad reg-
ulatory reforms without going through the burdensome task of
amending individual statutes. However, the bills proposed by
Republican leaders seem deliberately designed to prevent agen-
431, at 440-44 (1989) (discussing how legislators can use procedures such as the
Administrative Procedure Act to monitor and control agencies).
59 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
60 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see generally Seidenfeld,.supra note 50.
61 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEo. L.. 523 (1992).
62 See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1524-27 (arguing that it is diffl-
cult for Congress to use agency procedures to control agency behavior, espe-
cially because legislative coalitions are unstable); see also Kathleen Bawn,
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative'
Procedures, 89 AM. POL. Sci. Rnv. 62, 62-63 passim (1995) (arguing that Con-
gress is less likely to use procedures to control agency behavior when technical
and political uncertainties are significant).
63 See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 117-18 n.184, 136 (discussing
power of Congress to use budget or confirmation process to control agencies);
Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1551-52 (same).
64 See generally NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BREACH OF
FAITH: How THE CoNTRACT's FINE PRINT UNDERMINES AMERICA'S ENvI-
RONMENTAL SUCCESS 3-10 (discussing how proposed H.R. 9's (Job Creation
and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995) provisions would impose unnecessary
procedural barriers on the ability of agencies to promulgate health regulations
and enforce them); John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself:
The Role of Risk in Environmental Decisionmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1643
(1995). But see John D. Graham, Edging Toward Sanity on Regulatory Risk
Reform, ISSUES IN ScI. & TECH., Summer 1995, at 61-66 (arguing that H.R. 1022
(Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995) has been unfairly attacked and
should become law with some revisions).
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cies from issuing any significant regulations by imposing complex
analytical requirements. Agencies could not .effectively imple-
ment such requirements without significantly increasing agency
staff and available resources. Such an increase cannot occur in
the face of Congressional reduction of agency budgets. These
bills are currently stalled in the Senate.6 s
B. The Presidency Lacks a Long-Term Focus
Presidents have sought more centralized control over the
federal bureaucracy, but have often faced strong congressional
resistance.66 Nevertheless, presidential oversight of agencies has
been more systematic and effective than legislative oversight.67
Commentators disagree about the desirability of strong pres-
idential control over agency decisionmaking. Because of the
President's unique national constituency and ability to act more
decisively than a legislature,69 the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent is a logical place to locate a centralized management struc-
ture to coordinate the allocation of resources and consistency of
policies among agencies.70
On the other hand, White House intervention may under-
mine the relatively open, public rulemaking process of agencies,
allowing special interests with presidential connections to exert
undue influence.71 A President may occasionally exercise con-
trol of agencies to advance political interests rather than to im-
prove policy implementation of statutory goals. Agencies are
65 See, e.g. S. 439, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S.291, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); See generally John H. Cushman, Jr., Democrats Force the G.O.P. to Pull
Anti-Regulation Bill, N.Y. Tmms, July 19, 1995, at Al, All (reporting that Sen-
ator Dole could not obtain enough votes to pass his proposed regulatory reform
bill and will likely have to make changes to secure Democratic votes).
66 See Richard H. ildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. C-n. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1995); Shapiro, supra note 53, at 16-19 (dis-
cussing political and institutional competition between Congress and President
to control regulatory agencies).
67 See Shapiro, supra note 53, at 7-8.
68 See Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1180-82, 1204-05 (noting that manycom-
mentators believe the President. must lead regulatory reform efforts);
Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 1-2 (citing sources criticizing and favoring presi-
dential oversight of agency policymaking).
69 See Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1193-94.
70 See SUNsrjN, supra note 2, at 107-08; Andrews, supra note 97, at 574.
71 See Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 3, 19-25.
72 See Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1199-1200; see generally William N. Fs-
kridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick- Enforcing the Original Con-
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better suited to conducting anticipatory planning than congres-
sional or presidential institutions because both hazards and rele-
vant knowledge about them evolve more rapidly than can
regulatory statutes or the President's priorities.73
1. Why OMB Is Not Up to the Job
Potentially, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
can improve coordination of environmental policy because it has
a broader view of issues than any single agency.74 On the other
hand, critics have charged that OMB is often biased: OMB's
staff consists primarily of economists and budget experts and it
has limited technical expertise compared to line agencies such as
EPA.75 As a result, OMB focuses too narrowly on controlling
regulatory costs rather than on reducing human health risks or
conducting long-term research.76 OMB argues that it focuses on
policy and economics rather than on technical analyses,77 but a
full comprehension of the issues depends on having a solid tech-
nical background.78
As part of its cost-benefit analysis, OMB has applied present
value discounting to future environmental and health benefits. 79
stitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 61.
73 Andrews, supra note 35, at 526-32. Professor Sunstein has proposed cre-
ating an entity within the White House with the mission of long-term planning
or assigning this goal to OMB. See SUNSTmIN, supra note 2, at 108.
74 See DANIEL J. FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 75 (1995);
SUNs-TEIN, supra note 2, at 108 (proposing creation of function within OMB to
resolve conflicts and establish priorities among various policies); Robert A.
Katzmann, Have We Lost the Ability to Govern? The Challenge of Making Pub-
lic Policy, 72 OR. L. REv. 231, 240 (1993) (same).
75 BREYER, supra note 28, at 69 (noting that OMB's lack of substantive ex-
pertise hampers its ability to review regulations and coordinate regulatory pol-
icy); FioRino, supra note 74, at 76 (noting that only about six OMB staff review
EPA's rules); Andrews, supra note 35, at 575 (arguing that OMB's lack of sub-
stantive expertise hampers its ability to review regulations and coordinate regu-
latory policy).
76 See BREYER, supra note 28, at 68-69 (stating that OMB's staff primarily
consists of budget analysts and economists and is biased toward cost control
rather than reducing risks); Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 16-17 (noting that
OMB's staff is biased toward cost control rather than reducing risks).
77 See FioRno, supra note 74, at 76.
78 See generally BREYER, supra note 28, at 69 (arguing that OMB's lack of
technical expertise handicaps its ability to manage regulatory policy); Shapiro,
supra note 53, at 24 (arguing that OMB's lack of expertise, its distrust of agen-
des, and its failure to be selective weaken its effectiveness).
79 Farber & Henmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 277-79.
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Commentators have criticized OMB for using too high a discount
rate, although they differ on whether to prohibit discounting alto-
gether or to use an intermediate rate.80 OME's original ten per-
cent real rate of discount appears to have been based upon a
flawed "hurdle rate" of interest approach,81 and other implausi-
ble assumptions.82 OMB's new seven percent discount rate is
still substantially higher than that used by most analysts.p
Some commentators have proposed to improve OMB's role
in coordinating environmental policy by increasing its technical
staff and by introducing a more comprehensive approach to risk
regulation than simple cost-benefit analysis s 4 Others have sug-
gested that OMB can play a beneficial role in eliminating unnec-
essary regulations and improving the cost-effectiveness of
continuing regulations in conjunction with the Office of Science
and Technology (OST), which is discussed below.8s Even with
added technical expertise, however, OMB is not the best institu-
tion to direct long-term environmental policy because the OMB
exists to serve the short-term interests of the President.s6 Espe-
so See generally Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 269-70 passim
(proposing discount rate of one or two percent); Spear, supra note 10, at 127-28
(opposing the use of discounting). Even some opponents of present value dis-
counting, however, concede that society may take into account that we are in-
creasingly uncertain about whether an accident will occur in ten years time and
that society may discount future deaths if we are less certain that they will actu-
ally occur. See Spear, supra note 10, at 128.
81 See FRANK S. ARNOLD, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY AND REGULATION 186-89 (1995) (arguing that hurdle rate approach is in-
correct because it reduces to one step what should be a two-step calculation:
(1) discount to the present value the future benefits at the consumption rate of
interest; and (2) subtract the social costs based upon the shadow price of capi-
tal-consumption rate of interest).
82 OMB appears to have assumed that the cost of public projects would be
entirely funded by borrowing rather than by taxes, that there are high real
gross-of-tax rates of return on these displaced investments, and that the supply
of investment funds is inelastic, so that changes in private-sector investment in
response to financing government projects are potentially large. See id. at 1S9.
83 There has been considerable disagreement about how to measure the con-
sumption rate of interest, depending upon the nature of the assets in the portfo-
lio, but analysts most often use a two or three percent interest rate, although a
few, perhaps influenced by OMB's discounting rate, use five to seven percent.
Id. at 192. Professor Nordhaus in evaluating the problem of global warming
used a short-term rate of about six percent, and a longer-term rate of approxi-
mately three percent. See infra note 336.
84 See generally Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 87, 125-26.
85 See Graham, supra note 64, at 63-66 (arguing OMB and OST should work
together to allocate resources to the greatest risks).
86 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 575.
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cially when different parties control the White House and Con-
gress, Congress has reacted to 0MB 's attempts to micromanage
agency policies by enacting rigid statutes designed to eliminate
OMB's influence, often at the expense of depriving agencies of
necessary discretion.87 A more politically independent coordi-
nating agency is needed, which is not hostage to changes in presi-
dential administrations, which does not provoke overly rigid
congressional statutes, and which has a mission to improve rather
than eliminate regulation.
2. The President's Scientists
During the 1940s, Vannevar Bush informally served as a
presidential science advisor, and since 1951 the President has had
an officially designated Science Advisor.88 The influence of that
position has varied greatly in different presidential administra-
tions. OST has achieved its greatest influence by providing tech-
nical advice to OMB, but there are political pressures and
dangers in that alliance.8 9 There are limitations on the indepen-
dence of the Science Advisor because her influence depends
upon a close working relationship with the President, and she
must focus on problems that the President regards as immedi-
ately important.90
The Advisor lacks the staff necessary to oversee regulatory
agencies. 91 The failure of OST to participate in reporting raises
serious questions about its ability to formulate science policy.
The scientific and academic communities that form the ,natural
87 See Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 18-19.
88 See generally EDWARD J. BURGER, JR., SCIENCE AT THE WHITE HousE:
A POLITICAL LIABILITY 6-11 (1980) (providing history of the Science Advisor);
William G. Wells, Jr., Science Advice from Roosevelt to Ford, in SCIENCE AD-
VicE TO THE PRESIDENT 253-82 (William T. Golden ed., 1993).
89 See generally David Z. Robinson, Politics in the Science Advising Process,
in SCIENCE ADVICE, supra note 88, at 223-224 (suggesting that the Science Ad-
visor form alliance with OMB, but observing that Science Advisor's position
was abolished by President Nixon in part "because a powerful OMB director
did not see the value of independent advice").
90 See William A. Blanipied, The Limitations of White House Science Advice,
in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CONORESS, AND
JUDICIARY 41 (William T. Golden ed., 2d ed. 2d prg. 1995); see generally BUR-
GER, supra note 88, at 17-24, 114-24 (discussing political pressures on govern-
ment science advisors).
91 See BREYER, supra note 28, at 69 (stating that "[tihe Office of Science
Advisor to the President has considerable scientific expertise, but that office,
and others like it, lacks size, experience with the administrative detail that ac-
companies specific program implementation, and direct authority").
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constituencies of the Science Advisor are relatively weak politi-
cally, and cannot protect OST from presidential political pres-
sures.92 While the President's science advisors have sometimes
played a role in shaping environmental policy,93 OST has only a
few environmental specialists and would have to expand those
capabilities if it were to take a larger role in these matters. 4
3. Council on Environmental Quality
NEPA created a Council on Environmental Quality (Coun-
cil), consisting of three members, including a Chairperson, ap-
pointed by the President, and assisted by a staff, within the
Executive Office of the President.95 Throughout the 1970s,
under both Republican and Democratic Presidents, the Council
played an active role in overseeing agencies and issuing widely
distributed annual reports. Most notably, in 1978, the Council
promulgated regulations governing how agencies prepare envi-
ronmental assessments and impact statements under NEPA.96
The Council's staff grew to about fifty and included substantial
expertise in ecology and environmental science as well as eco-
nomics, policy, and law.97 The Reagan Administration, however,
at the suggestion of OMB Director David Stockman, deliberately
destroyed the Council in all but name by firing the overwhelming
majority of its professional staff and drastically reducing its
92 See BURGER, supra note 88, at xwiii.
93 See generally BURGER, supra note 88, at 73-97 (discussing role of presi-
dential science advisors on environmental policy during the Nixon
Administration).
94 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 531 (noting that the President's Science
Advisor has only a few environmental staff members). In January 1993, the
total staff of OST totaled 65, including 43 full-time equivalents with the remain-
der consisting of detailees on short-term assignments from other federal agen-
des, liaison representatives from other agencies, and various Fellows. See D.
ALLAN BROMILEY, THE PRESIDENT'S ScrNmsTs: REMrmscNI cEs OF A WHITE
HOUSE SCIENCE ADVISOR 42 (1994). The total budget was $6.25 million. Id. at
42.
95 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1994); Andreen, supra note 37, at 215-29
(discussing legislative history of NEPA and creation of the Council).
96 See generally Andreen, supra note 37, at 230-42 (discussing the Councils
role in advising agency on NEPA issues and issuing NEPA regulations); An-
drewssupra note 35, at 531 n.77, 575-76 (discussing general role of the Council
during the 1970s).
97 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 531 n.77, 575-76 (discussing general role of
the Council during the 1970s).
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budget.98 During the Bush Administration, Michael Deland pro-
vided professional leadership, but the Council never regained a
critical mass of budget and staff expertise 9 In January 1995,
President Clinton merged the Office of Environmental Policy
into the Council, appointing the -head of that Office as the Chair
of the Council and increasing its staff to nineteen full-time
members.100
The changing fortunes of the Council illustrate how vulnera-
ble White House institutions can be to changes in presidential
administration101 The support of environmentalists has pre-
vented Presidents from eliminating the Council, but the conflict
between serving the outside political interests of environmental-
ists as well as the internal interests of the White House has weak-
ened the Council's influence.1°2 By contrast, EPA has endured
policy and budget shifts when presidential administrations have
changed, but none so drastic as the Council.10 3
In creating the Council, Congress never intended to give it
substantive authority over government agencies or even to serve
as a watchdog over them; instead, the Senate Report and subse-
quent statements by the bill's sponsors suggest that the Council's
role was limited to advising the President on the general per-
formance of agencies in addressing environmental issues.10 4 EPA
occasionally refers disputes between it and other government
agencies about the preparation of environmental assessments to
the Council, but the Council has merely an advisory role and re-
fuses to entertain referrals which challenge the substantive merits
98 See Andreen, supra note 37, at 259 n.361 (noting that the total staff
number fell from 49 in 1979 to nine in 1987); Andrews, supra note 35, at 576
(noting that the Reagan Administration eliminated the Council's entire profes-
sional staff).
99 Andrews, supra note 35, at 576.
100 General Policy: White House Council Seeks to Coordinate Efforts in Re-
forming Laws, McGinty Says, 25 Env't Rep. 2196 (March 10, 1995) (after
merger with Office of Environmental Policy, the Council has nineteen staff
members). President Clinton has reconfigured the Council by appointing a sin-
gle Chairperson, Kathleen McGinty, and refusing to fill the other two Commis-
sioner positions. 1d.
101 See.Andrews, supra note 35, at 575-76.
102 See generally BuRGER, supra note 88, at xvim-xix.
103 See generally FiOmNo, supra note 74, at 37-43 @roviding summary of
EPA's history from 1970 to 1994).
104 See Andreen, supra note 37, at 254.
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of final agency decisions.105 The overall quality of environmental
policymaking might improve if the President or Congress gave
the Council greater authority to review and coordinate the deci-
sions of line agencies, but the Council's unstable history raises
serious questions about whether White House institutions should
have the leading role.
C. Courts Lack the Necessary Expertise and Jurisdiction
This Article proposes to refurbish the New Deal model of
administrative law, which assumes that courts will normally defer
to agencies in matters of substance.106 Courts and litigation in
some cases can improve social policy.107 In the case of complex
environmental regulations, however, judicial review of agency
decisionmaking is too often counterproductive because courts
simply lack the expertise to question an agency's substantive
judgments and there is too much emphasis on procedural formal-
ities. Courts are even less suited to review decisions affecting fu-
ture generations.
1. Judicial Deference and Long-Term Planning
While the basic standards of review in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) have remained the same, 03 judicial review
of agencies' decisions shifted in the 1970s from traditional defer-
105 See Andreen, supra note 37, at 210-12,253-61 (arguing that the Council or
EPA should review the substantive merits of final agency decisions).
106 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1676-77, 1683-84, 1711-12 (1975) (discussing New
Deal or expertise model of admini trative law); see also Bruce Ackerman &
William T. Hassler, CLEAN CoA.DmTY AIR 4, passim (1981) (same); Joel Yel-
ln, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government Institutional Designs
for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE LJ. 1300, 1301 n.3 (1983) (citing
sources).
107 There has been a long debate about the role of the judiciary in effecting
social change. See Robert A. Katzmann, Making Sense of Congressional Intent:
Statutory Interpretation and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE LJ. 2345, 2353-54 (1995)
(reviewing R. SHE MXucic, B-vEEN THE LiN~s: INTERETN WELFARE
RIGHTs (1994)) (arguing that Melnick's book provides evidence that courts can
influence social policy). But see GERALD N. RosENBERG, TiE Hou.ow HoiE
CAN CouRrs BRING AnoUT SociAL CHANGE? 336-41 (1991) (arguing courts
are ineffective at producing social change).
103 5 U.S.C. 702 (1994). Courts normally focus on whether informal agency
action such as rulemaking was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,"
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994), or whether in an individual adjudication,
there was substantial evidence for the agency's decision. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(1994); see BREYER, supra note 28, at 57.
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ence towards regulatory decisions to a hard look at a reviewable
record, requiring far more extensive documentation of the merits
of the decision than merely a reasonable judgment on the part of
the administrator.10 9 There are a number of arguments in favor
of more stringent judicial review, including the need to force ad-
ministrators to explain their reasoning to the public, to prevent
regulated industries from "capturing" the regulating agency, to
facilitate public participation in the administrative process, and
to force agency compliance with congressional mandates 10
Judicial review, however, frequently is a serious impediment
to an agency that seeks to engage in long-term planning and pri-
ority-setting."' Judicial decisions often lead to unintended con-
sequences,112 such as lengthy delays, 13 distortion of agency
agendas by forcing low-risk issues to the front of the regulatory
queue,1 14 or the adoption by agencies of time-consuming proce-
109 Andrews, supra note 35, at 545; see generally Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding that a court must review
"whole record" compiled by agency and that agency must explain its reasons for
a decision based upon factors in the record rather than by post hoc rationaliza-
tions in affidavits).
110 See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regu-
latory Control Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REO. 277,
289 (1992) (searching judicial review may have some place in reviewing agency
compliance with congressional mandates); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The
Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretations, 57 LAW & CON.
TEMP. PROBS. (Winter and Spring 1994); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role
of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEo. L.J 705, 737 (1992).
111 Andrews, supra note 35, at 545-46.
- 112 BREYER, supra note 28, at 58 (offering as an example the use of alterna-
tive procedures, such as a product recall, in lieu of agency rulemaking). "Ag-
gressive judicial attention to the establishment of threshold levels of risk, to the
cdrtainty with which they are established, and to the reliability of the agency's
scientific case, can impose a burden of proof' that is extremely difficult and
expensive or impossible to meet. Applegate, supra note 110, at 297. A court's
requirement that regulators should consider "alternatives" to a total regulatory
ban may result in unproductive delays. BREYER, supra note 28, at 58; see also
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (overturn-
ing EPA's rule banning asbestos brake linings because agency did not consider
alternatives).
113 See BREYER, supra note 28, at 58. Such remands or agency procedures
engendered by the threat of such review often lead to delays in the approval of
products thatwould be safer than those on the market. See generally Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best" The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 277, 307-14 (1985). Many judges recognize that
a decision to set aside an agency rule often creates a number of difficulties and
delays, and, therefore, hesitate to overrule an agency's decision. BREYER,
supra note 28, at 57-58.
114 BREYER, supra note 28, at 57; Applegate, supra note 110, at 297.
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dures.1 5 As a consequence, rules often become frozen in place
and cannot adapt to changing scientific knowledge. 16 In theory,
judicial opinions could serve as a "second opinion" or check on
questionable agency decisionmaking, but because courts tend to
concentrate on procedural issues and defer to an agency's scien-
tific expertise, the adversarial process often does not adequately
address or improve the scientific underpinnings of administrative
decisions.117 Accordingly, many proponents of technocratic deci-
sionmaking have argued that courts should not intrude into
agency judgments about difficult scientific questions, or impose
burdensome procedural and documentation requirements.118
During the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has gener-
ally sought to rein in overly aggressive judicial review by lower
courts, but sometimes the Court has applied the "hard look"
standard to reverse an agency that, for example, failed to explain
a change in policy.119 The Court has been especially sensitive to
115 BvaEE, supra note 28, at 49.
116 B.ExR, supra note 28, at 49; John S. Applegate, How to Save the Na-
tional Priorities List from the D.C. Circuit and Itself, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENvT_. L. 211,220-22,231 (1993-94); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE LI. 1385, 1392 (1992).
117 See generally Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
701 F.2d 1137, 1140, 1146 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting Occupational Safety and
Health Administration standard because it was not based on what in the court's
view constituted "good science"); Kenneth S. Abraham & Richard A. Merrill,
Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, IssuEs n SC. & TECH., Winter 1936, at 93,
97-99 (criticizing Gulf South); Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic
Health Risks: An Essay in Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 EcoL-
oGY L.Q. 339, 344-49 (1982) (criticizing Court for agreeing ith qualitative
findings of benzene risk, but confounding lack of quantitative data with inabil-
ity to provide such data); Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear
Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARv. L. REv. 489, 497-500,
549 (1981) (arguing there is need for "second opinions" in environmental deci-
sionmaking and suggesting courts have failed to provide such opinions).
118 See JoBm D. GRAum Er Ai-, IN SEARCH oF SAtEiv. CHEIMCALS AND
CANCER RISK 215 (1988); Abraham & Merrill, supra note 117, at 106; Apple-
gate, supra note 110, at 297.
119 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, the Supreme Court held that "consid-
erable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." 467 U.S. 837, 844. It further
stated that "an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsi-
bilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incum-
bent admiiiistration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments." Id at 865.
However, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43,53-56 (1983), the Court sent conflicting messages about the appro-
priate level of review: first, warning that "[t]he scope of review ... is narrow
and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency," and second,
the majority seemingly engaged in aggressive substantive review of the agency
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agency decisions involving difficult technical questions at the
"frontiers of science." In 1983, the Supreme Court in Baltimore
Gas & Electric. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council120
(Vermont Yankee IV) held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion's decision that nuclear power plant licensing boards should
assume, for the purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of
nuclear wastes would have no significant impact, and thus should
not affect the decision whether to license a particular nuclear
power plant, was within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking
required by the APA.121 The Supreme Court declared that "a
reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making
predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as
opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must gener-
ally be at its most deferential." 122
The author agrees with the Court's deferential approach to
predictions at the frontiers of science. Courts are not institution-
ally well-suited to make long-term predictions or to readjust
agency priorities. 2 3 On the other hand, it would have been wise
finding that passive seat belts would be ineffective. See also Sidney A. Shapiro
& Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review
of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuiE L.J 1051, 1066 (1995) (discussing mixed
messages in State Farm).
120 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983)(Vermont Yankee)(8-0 decision). Justice Powell
took no part in the consideration or hearing of the case. Id. at 108.
121 The Vermont Yankee decision generated considerable controversy. See
generally Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1833 (1978) (criticizing "hard look" ju-
dicial review for intruding too deeply upon the administrative process and argu-
ing that the Supreme Court, in 1978, should not have remanded Vermont
Yankee for further factual findings). But see Andrew D. Siegel, The Aftermath
of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC: A Broader Notion of Judicial Def-
erence to Agency Expertise, 11 HARv. ENvTL. L. RFv. 331, 378-80 (1987) (argu-
ing that Vermont Yankee be limited to its facts because: (1) Justice O'Connor
did not support her broad statement of deference with adequate precedent or
reasoning; and (2) courts must provide meaningful check on exercise of agency
expertise).
122 Vermont Yankee, 462 L;.S. at 103. Under Vermont Yankee, courts review-
ing agency findings at the frontiers of science are apparently even more defer-
ential than when they apply the deferential Chevron standard to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
123 Choosing which environmental problems to address over a long period
involves a classic "polycentric" problem in which a decisionmaker must choose
among many competing concerns, and a decision as to one may affect all others,
but "reasoned adjudication, on the other hand, requires that the deci-
sionmaker's choices be narrowed to a bipolar standard or established succes-
sion of bipolar standards to which the tribunal can apply the facts it finds";
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to have a second opinion about the substantive merits of the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission's findings because of serious ques-
tions regarding the Commission's lack of objectivity about the
industry it regulated.124
Some commentators have suggested that courts can improve
the political process by reviewing administrative agency decisions
to prevent egregious interest group influence. -5 Such proposals,
however, raise serious questions about giving judges too much
authority to impose their own substantive values.126 In addition,
the judicial process is not necessarily better equipped than the
legislature to rein in powerful interest groups, who often have
more resources to conduct litigation and can even influence judi-
cial appointments. 27
Finally, the greater political insulation of federal judges is
not always desirable.'m While Congress is often overly respon-
sive to interest group political pressures, federal judges, who nor-
mally serve for life, are frequently overly insulated from popular
values.Y9 Article DIE federal judges are hardly representative of
American society in terms of education, professional achieve-
Applegate, supra note 110, at 338 (summarizing Lon Fuller's theory of adjudi-
cation); James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept, 51 IND.
LJ. 467-77, 497-98 (1976) (planning problems generally, and environmental
planning in particular, are polycentric); BRmE, supra note 28, at 57 (arguing
that courts normally lack the power to require agencies to create systematically
rational agendas and are less able than Congress to set priorities for the future);
Huber, supra note 113, at 331-32 (stating that public agencies are capable of
addressing both sides of public risk choices-risks incurred and risks averted-
but courts are not).
124 See, eg., Yellin, supra note 117, at 498-99, 531-49, 554 passim (arguing
that Atomic Energy Commission and its successor, Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, failed to deal with reactor safety and that its decisions should have
been reviewed by a skeptical but informed constituency).
125 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE LJ. 31, 33 (1991) (citing sources); See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretatioh: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLtrM. L. REv. 223,263-64 (19S6)
(arguing for a judicial role in reviewing agency decisions to prevent interest
group domination).
126 See Elhauge, supra note 125, at 60-61
127 See Elhauge, supra note 125, at 80-83. Professor Elhauge, however, ac-
knowledges that interest groups cannot necessarily predict all the issues that
will arise during a federal judge's lifetime tenure and that factor makes interest
group influence over the judiciary less certain. Elhauge, supra note 125, at 82-
83.
128 See Elhauge, supra note 125, at 83-87.
129 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1542.
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ment, or income and until recently were rarely women or minori-
ties.130 In addition, since the 1970s, federal judges have refused
to issue advisory opinions for the President or Congress. 131 The
federal courts have probably gained greater independence from
the political branches because of their unwillingness to issue ad-
visory opinions, but at the expense of participating in democratic
deliberation.132
While courts should not allow agencies to flout clear statu-
tory dictates or established procedures, the judiciary should rec-
ognize that agencies may consider political factors and
democratic debate when adjusting a statute to changing circum-
stances. Professor Strauss has argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. Volpe,133 which
held that the Secretary of Transportation had failed to consider
statutory commands discouraging the building of highways
through public parks, ignored the Secretary's careful considera-
tion of both national and local political factors.134 Similarly, the
Supreme Court's State Farm decision, which held that the Secre-
tary of Transportation had failed to explain sufficiently his rea-
sons for rescinding the passive restraint requirement issued by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 35 arguably
did not consider whether political forces and democratic dialogue
could constrain presidential ambitions.136 In some cases, courts
130 See CHRISTOPHER B. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 248-49 (1990);
Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1542.' Many states have attempted to lessen the
isolation of judges by adopting judicial elections, based on the assumption that
in a democratic society judges should reflect or be "common" enough to have
the interests of the people at heart. Seidenfeld, supra, note 52, at 1542.
131 Some state courts allow advisory opinions, but these courts "often main-
tain the notion that, in so doing, they are performing an extrajudicial function,
and that such opinions should consequently have dramatically limited stare de-
cisis effect." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 73 n.4
(1988) (listing Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota as authorizing judicial advisory opinions).
132 See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1543-44 (discussing judiciary's
inability to implement civic republican theory because of such things as its reac-
tive nature). It is true that federal judges often advise Congress about the need
for new legislation or revising an existing law. See Deanell R. Tacha, Judges
and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279, 283 (1991).
133 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
134 See generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judi-
cial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 1251 (1992).
135 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).
136 See generally JERRY L. MAsHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGoLE
FOR AuTo SAFETY (1990).
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applying the second step of Chevron might force an agency to
provide a more meaningful explanation of why its interpretation
or policies are consistent with a statute. 37 Nevertheless, courts
should generally defer to agency interpretations of statutes and
allow Congress or the President to use political or budgetary
power to change policies that fail to fulfill statutory purposes.138
2. Would Science Courts Be Better?
Some commentators have proposed the creation of special-
ized environmental or "science courts," institutions specifically
designed to deal with factual technical issues.139 Similar propos-
als for specialized courts have also failed because of a traditional
preference for generalist judges. 14
The primary premise for having a "Science Court" is that
scientific facts or issues, separate from moral, legal, or policy is-
sues, demand resolution by scientific experts.141 The proposal for
a Science Court has been criticized on the ground that it is im-
possible to separate technical from legal, normative, and political
issues. 42 There is a "large gray area between pure science and
pure policy" that cannot be addressed purely by a scientific anal-
ysis because of scientific uncertainty or the presence of economic
137 See Seidenfeld, supia note 50, at 129.
138 See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 117-18 n.184, 136 (discussing
ability of Congress to use budget or confirmation process to control agencies);
Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1551-52 (same).
139 Seep e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Tednology Democratically, 63
AM. ScmarsT 505 (1975) (proposing science court); Yellin, supra note 106, at
1307 n.35 (citing numerous commentators).
140 The implication is that specialized knowledge necessarily breeds elitists
and that generalists are more likely to have a broad sense of the public welfare.
See EDLEY, supra note 130, at 248. See also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Science
Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 Ercvn. L 1, 2 (1978); Harold Bruff Spe-
cialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 AIuI. L REv. 329 (1991) (discuss-
ing Article I legislative courts, Article II executive adjudicators, and Article III
judges with specialized dockets). Only in the areas of taxation and patents has
Congress created specialized courts, the tax court and Federal Circuit respec-
tively, and even in these areas there was some opposition. See Simon Rifkind,
A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37
A.B.A. J. 425 (1951).
141 See Sofaer, supra note 140, at 5-6 (explaining premises underlying propo-
sal for Science Court and especially belief that scientific issues can be separated
from legal, policy, or moral questions); Yellin, supra note 106, at 1305-03.
142 See generally Stephen L. Carter, Separatism and Skepticism, 92 YALE L.
1334, 1334-41 (1983); Sofaer, supra note 140, at 5-6,10-12,25; Yellin, supra note
106, at 1309-17.
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or social factors.143 If important environmental issues involve a
mixture of technical, policy, normative, and legal issues, then
generalist courts or political institutions may remain the best re-
viewing mechanism.144 Some commentators who oppose a Sci-
ence Court have proposed other ways to improve scientific
factfinding by courts.1 45'
Although judges with specialized knowledge or experience
have advantages compared to generalist judges, the very nature
of the judicial process limits the ability of judges to engage in a
deliberative dialogue with agency staff and interest groups. 146 In
addition, there is the danger that a specialized court might be
biased, especially in favor of the government.1 47 Furthermore,
judicial review by a Science Court may lead to procedural ossifi-
cation because an agency seeking to create a paper record may
devote excessive resources in order to compile a record.1 48
143 See William Allen, Note, The Current Federal Regulatory Framework for
Release of Genetically Altered Organisms Into the Environment, 42 FLA. L.
REv. 531, 537-38 (1990).
144 See generally Yellin, supra note 106, at 1325-33.
145 Such other methods of improvement include: the creation of a scientific
advisory body associated with the federal appellate courts; the use of special
masters; the greater use of court appointed expert witnesses; and the hiring ofjudicial clerks with a scientific background. See Carter, supra note 142, at 1339
(suggesting use of special scientific advisory panels, scientific aides for bureau-
crats, and science clerks for judges); Sofaer, supra note 140, at 25-26 (proposing
special scientific advisory panels within existing agencies); Yellin, supra note
106, at 1330 (discussing creation of a science advisory body for the federal judi.
ciary and use of special masters); Yellin, supra note 117, at 555-60 (same).
146 See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1557 (discussing staff involve-
ment in judicial decisionmaking).
147 There has been considerable debate about whether the Tax Court is bi-
ased in favor of the government. Compare Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court,
Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee:
A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 985, 998-99
(1991) (using statistical evidence to argue tax court is biased in favor of govern-
ment) with Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow
Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REv. 517,579 (1994) (arguing that Geier's
evidence does not take into account data in the Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue that shows taxpayers' overall savings as a percent-
age of amounts at issue in the tax court were approximately one-half higher
than in the district court and the Court of Federal Claims); David Laro, The
Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 17,
24-28 (arguing that tax court is not biased and that statistical analysis cannot
adequately compare tax court and other federal courts because tax court at-
tracts a different composition of cases).
148 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing problem of proce-
dural ossification).
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IV
THE CAPABILITY OF AGENCIES TO PROTECT
FUTURE GENERATIONS
In theory, the internal structure of government agencies and
the professional or technical staff "encourages deliberative deci-
sionmaking aimed at furthering public rather than private val-
ues. 1 49 Thus, agencies should have a comparative institutional
advantage in addressing long-term environmental issues com-
pared to Congress, the White House, or courts. In practice, how-
ever, the major health and environmental regulatory agencies
lack effective planning and priority-setting capabilities, especially
for long-term issues. 5 0 Because of the limited or nonexistent
statutory authority for conducting comprehensive planning,
agencies have tended to take a relatively narrow view of planning
and the overall role of their regulatory processes.151 Finally,
there is inadequate coordination among agencies.
A. Improving Long-Range Planning
1. The Need for Long-Term Planning
Some commentators believe that our expansive regulatory
system is unnecessary, and they provide examples involving mar-
ket incentives and self-regulation. 5 2 While eliminating regula-
tions and relying upon market incentives may be appropriate in
some circumstances, deregulation efforts do not address the fail-
ure of agencies to devote more resources to festering problems
nor to research currently unexamined risks in a more systematic
fashion.153
Anticipatory planning by regulatory agencies is necessary
because scientific knowledge about environmental and health
hazards changes more rapidly than the broad institutions of gen-
eral purpose governance can attend to them.154 For instance,
many environmental problems have been recognized as more
149 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1554-55.
150 Only in recent years have agencies begun to introduce limited procedures
for planning and setting systematic priorities among their diverse mandates.
Andrews, supra note 35, at 520-22.
151 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 522-23.
Im See Gouvin, supra note 7, at 489-90.
153 BREYEi, supra note 28, at 56.
'A "Planning" includes two equally important components: (1) anticipatory
planning involves the recognition of important problems at the first possible
opportunity, perhaps even before their emergence; and (2) regulatory planning,
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dangerous than was initially believed, including lead, indoor pol-
lution, radon, and the effects of chlorofluorocarbons on the
ozone layer and of combustion on global warming. 55 On the
other hand, scientific research has shown that asbestos and cer-
tain carcinogens are not such serious threats as scientists initially
believed.'5 6
While the inherent uncertainties of science make it difficult
for anyone'to determine the greatest environmental threats,
"[t]he press of agency business presents the primary obstacle to
effective anticipatory research . Statutes that impose short-
term deadlines consume an agency's scarce resources, leaving lit-
tle room for anticipatory research.' u5 7 In addition, either institu-
tional barriers within an agency, such as established research
programs, or external political pressures may prevent an agency
from performing new research or using new information.158
In order to respond to new priorities, agencies need the "au-
thority to use a broad range of policy interventions."15 9 Increas-
ing agency independence may create a greater incentive for the
agency to acquire technical knowledge upon which it will base its
decisions.' 60 One solution is to delegate to agencies broad au-
thority "to protect human health and the environment from
whatever hazards are most severe, not merely to regulate partic-
ular programs specified by statutes. 1 61
2. Evaluating EPA's Current Planning
EPA and other federal agencies have engaged in some long-
range environmental planning. 62 However, such planning is in-
hibited by: (1) the lack of an integrated, multimedia approach to
pollution reduction in most statutes; (2) statutory deadlines in ex-
isting programs and short-term political pressures; (3) inadequate
which involves allocating agency resources to active regulatory programs. An-
drews, supra note 35, at 517.
155 Andrews, supra note 35, at 527 n.53 (citing.sources).
156 Andrews, supra note 35, at 527 n.54 (citing sources).
157 Andrews, supra note 35, at 534.
158 Andrews, supra note 35, at 534-35 (citing sources). EPA will have to reor-
ganize its research budget and develop better anticipatory research capacities.
159 Andrews, supra note 35, at 533.
160 Bawn, supra note 62, at 66.
161 Andrews,. supra note 35, at 532.
162 See generally Andrews, supra note 35, at 538-72 (discussing planning in
EPA, Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration, and Consumer Product Safety Commission).
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and uncertain funding for anticipatory research and strategic
planning; and (4) the predilections of the current EPA Adminis-
trator in determining funding for long-term planning. 63
I "EPA's research mission has remained closely linked to the
operating mandates and priorities of its established regulatory
programs." 64 The overwhelming majority of EPA's current re-
search money is targeted for high-visibility issues such as acid
rain and immediate priorities rather than longer-range anticipa-
tory research.165 This limited focus has been exacerbated by seri-
ous budget limitations that make it difficult for the agency to
address every statutory mandate.166
EPA's Office of Research and Development "has been dom-
inated since its inception by the demand to produce information
to justify and defend immediate regulatory actions."167 Recogniz-
ing that the Office of Research and Development has little time
for long-range anticipatory research or planning, EPA has made
a number of attempts to create long-term research units, but
budget cuts, an emphasis on short-term priorities, and internal
agency politics have resulted in the elimination of a number of
promising efforts.'6
163 Andrews, supra note 35, at 556.
164 Andrews, supra note 35, at 551.
165 Andrews, supra note 35, at 552.
166 During the early 1980s, the Reagan administration reduced EPA's re-
search and development budget from $360 million to $250 million in the course
of two years and virtually eliminated long-range and anticipatory research. An-
drews, supra note 97, at 551. In nominal dollars, EPA's research budget has
gradually risen once again, but, in real dollars, the budget declined by about
eleven percent between 1980 and 1992. CARNEGiE COMzi'N ON ScENcE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND Gov'T, ENVIRONiENTAL REsEARCH AND DEVELOPMENr.
STRENGTHEMNIG THE FEDERAL b AsTRucruiE, 40 (1992); Andrews, supra
note 35, at 551-52; see also Bradford C. Mank, Superftund Contractors and
Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENvrL LJ. 34, 43 (1993) (stating that EPA's total
budget was stagnant in real terms between 1980 and 1992 despite an overall
increase in the agency's workload); Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 8 n.42 (arguing
that chronic underfunding of EPA prevents agency from fulfilling statutory
mandates).
167 Andrews, supra note 35, at 548-49.
16 See Andrews, supra note 35, 549-52 (discussing EPA's creation and then
abandonment of the Washington Environmental Research Center and the Of-
fice of Strategic Assessments and Special Studies). EPA still retains a modest
Office of Exploratory Research, which provides relatively minor funding for
competitive research grants and academic centers, but more needs to be done
to foster anticipatory research. Andrews, supra note 35, at 550-51. The Clinton
EPA established a new Science to Achieve Results (STAR) program, which
seeks to divide research funding evenly between immediate problems and long-
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3. Comparative Risk Assessment
Since 1987, EPA has studied the possibilities of using rela-
tive'risk as a primary criterion for setting priorities169 During the
Bush administration, EPA Administrator William Reilly made
comparative risk assessment and its implementation a personal
priority.170 During the Clinton Administration, a National Per-
formance Review Office headed by Vice President Gore issued a
report that endorsed risk prioritization, and called for greater
emphasis on identifying future risks and avoiding them.171 How
successfully the Clinton Administration will implement long-
range planning remains to be seen.
Agencies are too often limited -in their ability to readjust
either priorities or remedies because of narrow statutory com-
mands.172 Some commentators and environmental groups have
recommended transforming EPA into a cabinet-level Depart-
ment of the Environment and adopting a single, comprehensive
environmental protection statute within which priorities could be
term efforts, but the program faces an uncertain future in light of the 104th
Congress' desire to cut the agency's budget. See $Z4 Billion Request from
Agency Gets Cool Reception From Senate Panel, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 217
(May 19, 1995).
169 See EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORI-
TIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECriON 2, 16 (1990); EPA,
COMPARING RISKS AND SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORnES: OVERVIEW OF
THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS (1989); EPA, UNFINISHED BusiNEss: A COMPAR-
ATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987). These develop-
ments are described and critically reviewed in Andrews, supra note 35, at 553;
Donald T. Homstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 562,563-69 (1992); Symposium,
Risk Analysis and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 21
ENVTL. L. 1321-1424 (1991); Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal Gov-
ernment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 251-558 (1995).
170 See e.g., William K. Reilly, Taking Aim Toward 2000: Rethinking the Na-
tion's EnvironmentalAgenda, 21 ENvTL. L. 1359 (1991); William K. Reilly, The
Turning Point: An Environmental Vision for the 1990s, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1386 (Dec. 8, 1989); Andrews, supra note 35, at 554-55; Applegate, supra note
110, at 279.
171 See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REOuLATORY SYSTEMS 53-63
(1993); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Re-
view's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DuKE L.J. 1165, 1174-76
(1994) (discussing National Performance Review's recommendations for rank-
ing risks and engaging in anticipatory planning).
172 For example, EPA has only limited power to regulate indoor air pollution
even though the agency believes that such pollution poses a higher health risk
than many other hazards it regulates. Andrews, supra note 35, at 533 n.85.
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set with greater discretion.173 However, these proposals have
stalled in Congress, in part because of conservative efforts to re-
quire that all regulations be justified on the basis of scientific risk
assessment.174 There is a danger that Congress will adopt sym-
bolic legislation elevating EPA to cabinet-level status without
giving the agency enough authority or resources tO carry out
comparative risk assessment or long-term planning.175
-B. Planning Among the Agencies
The responsibilities, of the various regulatory agencies often
intersect or overlap because they regulate many of the same sub-
stances and therefore require similar scientific and technical in-
formation. 76 In addition, different agencies often regulate many
of the same firms and industrial processes with requirements that
may or may not harmonize or conflict.1" Furthermore, different
173 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE ENV'T, CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FU-
TURE 47-51 (1993) (endorsing proposal for Department of Environment with
general statute); CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TCmION Acr (SEcoND DRAFr 1988) (same); Andrews, supra note 97, at 524-25
(discussing Applegate and National Commission on the Environment); Apple-
gate, supra note 110, at 280,349-52 (discussing Conservation Foundation propo-
sal for cabinet-level Department of Environment and single, comprehensive
environmental protection statute, and arguing proposal would provide suitable
framework within which to set priorities).
174 Before 1995, Congress considered bills that would have created a cabinet-
level Department of the Environment, but House Democratic leaders in 1994
withdrew such a bill when it became clear that it could not be passed without
support from conservatives who demanded amendments requiring the pro-
posed Department to conduct risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses before
issuing regulations. See, e.g., H.R. 3425, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 171,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Applegate, supra note 110, at 280, 351-52 & n.424
(citing proposed legislation to create cabinet-level Department of Environ-
ment); Future of EPA Cabinet Bill Uncertain Following House Vote on Amend-
ment Rule, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1719 (Feb. 4,1994) (noting that House leaders
withdrew H.R. 3425 when it became clear that the bill could not win approval
without accepting conservative amendments requiring risk assessment and cost-
benefit analysis); EPA Cabinet Status, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1660 (Jan. 21,1994)
(discussing conservative efforts to add risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis
requirement amendments to bills proposing cabinet-level Department of Envi-
ronment). The Republican-dominated 104th Congress is focusing on these con-
servative regulatory reforms and appears to be uninterested in elevating the
status of EPA.
175 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 579-80.
176 GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND PoUcy IN
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIEs 207 (1987); Andrews, supra note 35, at 572.
177 See BRYNER, supra note 176, at 207; Andrews, supra note 35, at 572.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
1996]
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
agencies study the same trends and events that affect their priori-
ties over time.178 .
Overlapping jurisdiction between different agencies often
causes serious problems. For example, different agencies or even
different departments within the same agency have sometimes
applied different standards for measuring the harmfulness of the
same substance or conduct.179
There are two major ways to improve coordination among
agencies: (1) throughmanagement by the Executive Office of
the President; or (2) through direct coordination among in-
dependent regulatory agencies.' 80 During the Carter Adminis-
tration, the heads of all major health, safety, and environmental
regulatory agencies created an informal organization, the Inter-
agency Regulatory Liaison Group, chaired by EPA Administra-
tor Douglas Costle, to coordinate regulatory initiatives and
improve shared analytical methods and assumptions.181 Presi-
dent Reagan, however, discontinued the Group because inter-
agency regulatory agenda-setting was at odds with his emphasis
on centralized control by OMB and his broader philosophy of
deregulation.18 2 Vice President Gore's National Performance
Review has proposed to revive the Interagency Regulatory Coor-
dinating Group.'8 3 In Executive Order No. 12,881, President
Clinton established a National Science and Technology Council
chaired by himself with the express goal of coordinating the sci-
entific and technology policymaking process in the federal gov-
ernment submitting recommendations to the Director of
178 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 572.
179 For example, EPA sets pesticide tolerance levels for residues in foods
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 administered by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but until rdcently the two agencies had
different standards for what is an acceptable risk and for calculating how many
lives will be saved by their regulations. See BREYER, supra note 28, at 21 (not-
ing five-fold discrepancy between EPA and FDA methods for calculating how
many cancer deaths EPA regulations would prevent); Andrews, supra note 97,
at 573 (noting that EPA and FDA have different standards for acceptable risk).
180 Andrews, supra note 35, at 572.
181 See MARK K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEcrION
AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 172-203 (1990) (providing a de-
tdiled history of Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group); Andrews, supra note
35, at 572-73.
182 See Lmy, supra note 181, at 172-203; Andrews, supra note 35, at 572-
73.
183 See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, supra note 171, at 18-19; Lubbers,
supra note 171, at 1170.
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OMB. 8 4 In addition, President Clinton's Executive Order No.
12,866 authorizes the establishment of "Regulatory Working
Groups," which will coordinate the development of regulatory
tools and common policies among agencies that have similar re-
sponsibilities and missions.185 While these Clinton initiatives
hold promise for improving interagency coordination functions,
these proposals are "only moderately ambitious;"1 6 these orders
do not establish strong institutions that are likely to survive a
Republican Presidency.
V
CAN WE CREATE BETTER AGENCIES?
The current ineffectiveness of agencies at addressing long-
term environmental problems raises broader questions about
how to improve their ability to tackle complex social issues. In
order to address long-term problems, agencies need more re-
sources and greater freedom from short-term political pressures.
Better science alone is not enough. In practice, both politics and
science influence policy, but rarely is there meaningful dialogue
between their different perspectives. 8 7
A. Are Agencies Capable of Reforming Themselves?
Some commentators argue that agencies are usually incapa-
ble of reforming themselves because individual administrators
often do not serve long enough to effect change; changes in presi-
dential administrations frequently lead to policy shifts that
undermine innovations implemented by the previous administra-
tion.188 Further, the internal dynamics of bureaucracies also
184 Its membership includes several cabinet secretaries and high-level White
House staff, the heads of various safety and environmental agencies, the Vice
President, and the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Exec.
Order No. 12,881, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,491 (1993). The Clinton Administration has
also made some efforts toward informal consultation at a monthly "breakfast
club" by the Secretaries or Administrators of EPA, Agriculture, Energy, and
Interior. Andrews, supra note 35, at 573.
185 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993); Lubbers, supra
note 171, at 1170 (noting that National Performance Review recommended
Regulatory Working Group and President Clinton adopted proposal); Shapiro,
supra note 53, at 39.
186 See Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1202-04.
187 See Heinzerling, supra note 28, at 472-73.
188 See Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1189-90.
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make it difficult to change administrative behavior.18 9 Congress
often interferes with the ability of agencies to implement statutes
or to improve regulatory performance because even legislators
who vote for a statute may not always desire that a statute be
implemented as it is written. Current legislatures may also take
issue with a statute because they have different preferences than
those of the legislature that enacted it.190
Despite the difficulties in achieving systematic administra-
tiVe reform, the potential benefits to society from such reforms
demand that politicians and administrators try their best to enact
them. Reforms are more likely to be realized if agency adminis-
trators and staff engage in a constructive dialogue with the public
and the political branches.
B. The Public and the Environment
Some commentators believe that further reforms are neces-
sary to increase public participation in the regulatory process,' 9'
questioning whether agency bureaucrats actually possess useful
scientific knowledge that enables them to make more informed
decisions than members of the general public.192 Proponents of a
"public" approach to regulation often argue that popular values
are entitled to prima facie acceptance in public decisionmaking
unless there are adequate grounds for deviation.19 3 Finally, the
major advances in environmental protection have in fact primar-
ily resulted from the combination of public involvement, "repub-
lican moments," and legislative credit-seeking, rather than from
bureaucratic initiatives or interest group politics.194
189 Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1190.
190 Rodriguez, supra note 49, at 1191-92.
191 See Hornstein, supra note 169, at 633.
192 See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1071-85 (1990) (arguing that the quantitative risk assess-
ment creates a misleading sense of certainty and is excessively narrow in focus-
ing expected loss of life while ignoring other issues such as the voluntariness of
risk, or the relative concentration or dispersion of damage); Hornstein, supra
note 169, at 562-64, 583-84, 610-11 (arguing that risk assessment has serious
flaws because of data limitations, the use of heuristics, the threat that regulated
industries will capture an agency, and failures in comparing different types of
health risks or in making value-free decisions).193 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 293.
194 The term "republican moment" may be somewhat misleading because it
implies that the environmental movement is the product of a few, brief bursts of
intense popular support; it is more accurate to say that the environmental
movement has enjoyed at least moderate levels of popular support since the
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Commentators who favor technocratic decisionmaking often
argue that the public is unable to understand complex risk is-
sues1 95 and believe that government experts can make better de-
cisions.1 96 Proponents of technocratic decisionmaking sometimes
point out that there are dangers if populist movements perpetu-
ate unscientific myths about environmental risks.197
A crucial question is how to incorporate popular values and
participation into a decisionmaking process that also relies upon
scientific and technical information. 93 If public risk perceptions
late 1960s, with some peaks that played a role in enacting major pieces of envi-
ronmental legislation. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons From Federal Pesticide
Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform: Poli-
tics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE 1. ON REG. 369, 406-20 (1993)
(discussing concept of republican moments). But see Thomas S. Ulen, Com-
ments on Daniel A. Farber, "Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law", 8
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 82,86-87 (1992) (questioning whether theory of "republican
moments" adequately explains development of environmental movement in
1970s). Some critics of the environmental movement have charged that it pri-
marily serves the interests of upper-middle-class whites, but the emergence of
the environmental justice movement in recent years has made environmental-
ism less elitist. See Mark E. Rushefsky, Elites and Environmental Policy, in EN.
VIRONMENTAL PoLrIcs & Poucy. THEORIEs AND EvIDENcE 261, (James P.
Lester, ed.) (1989) (examining the role of elites in determining appropriate risk
levels for environmental decisionmaking).
195 Cognitive error theory has shown that the public is incapable of making
consistent decisions about risky options based solely upon the way these op-
tions are framed. Breyer, supra note 28, at 36; Frank B. Cross, The Public Role
in Risk Control, 24 ENVrL. L. 887, 899-904 (1994); Hornstein, supra note 169, at
604-10. The public habitually overestimates sensational but unlikely risks such
as nuclear accidents or waste disposal compared to high-fat diets. See, eg.,
BREYER, supra note 28 at 36. Study after study shows that the public's evalua-
tion of risk problems differs radically from any consensus of experts in the field,
in part because the mass media presents a distorted perspective on relative risks
and also as a result of the public's cognitive dissonance or denial of familiar
risks. BREYERP, supra note 28, at 33.
196 See, e.g. BREYER, supra note 28, at 33-39 (noting that public risk percep-
tions are often flawed and there is little reason to hope for better risk communi-
cation over time).
197 See Cross, supra note 195 at 887, 949-55 (arguing that reliance upon pub-
lic misperceptions about risk may in some cases endanger public health); Frank
B. Cross, The Risk of Reliance on Perceived Risk, Psta IssuEs IN HEALTH &
SAF=TY 59, 64-70 (1992) (discussing use of scientific myths by racists and totali-
tarian regimes to harm minority groups).
19s Possible approaches for involving public values and qualitative data in-
clude: (1) developing formulas that assign numbers to, and thus incorporate,
qualitative differences; (2) creating a two-stage analytical process based first
upon conventional cost-benefit analysis and then upon qualitative factors; and
(3) using different forms of citizen participation to educate decision-makers
about informed public views about how different risks should be treated.
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are based upon factual misinformation or cognitive distortions,
then agencies should reject such falsehoods. On the other hand,
agencies should seriously consider public beliefs based upon dif-
ferent normative evaluations of risk distribution or the fairness
of procedures. In addition, agencies should determine under
what circumstances public opinion may not sufficiently take into
account the interests of the future. Civic republican theory
shows how agencies might be able to achieve a reconciliation be-
tween scientific and popular values.
C. Republicanism and Bureaucratic Deliberation
Proponents of a civic republican approach to politics distin-
guish between deliberative democracy, which requires both ac-
tive political participation and public discussion about what
constitutes the good for society as a whole, and pluralist politics,
which is based upon the aggregation of competing private inter-
,ests.199 Deliberative democracy requires people at least in part
to transcend their individual interests and base decisions upon
reason rather than on power.2 00 While modem civic republican
theory explicitly rejects elite control and seeks to prevent any
individual from being subservient to other political actors,201
there is a potential conflict between deliberation and participa-
tion if only an elite is interested or willing to engage in delibera-
tive politics. 202
The role administrative agencies can play in facilitating pub-
lic participation and deliberation is debatable.2 03 Because of
their greater distance from the public than the elective branches
and their professional or technical training, bureaucrats in some
199 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1514, 1528-33 (defining civic republican-
ism); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541
(1988) (identifying "deliberation in politics" as the first principle of republican-
ism). Modem civic republican theorists trace their roots to republican political
theorists of the American Revolutionary and Constitutional period, but modem
versions are not necessarily consistent with their eighteenth century ancestors.
200 See Note, Civic Republican Administrative Theory; Bureaucrats as Delib-
erative Democrats, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1402-03 (1994); see generally
Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1528-33 (defining civic republicanism).
201 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1528-32.
22 See Note, supra note 200, at 1403-05; Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate
Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 854-93 (1993).
23 Compare Seidenfeld, supra note 52 (bureaucracy can play positive role in
fostering republican dialogue) with Note, supra note 200 (arguing republicanjustifications of bureaucracy contain implicit elitist and antidemocratic
tendencies).
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ways are better suited than members of the public or even Con-
gress to engage in deliberation and reflect upon the public
good.204 However, even proponents of bureaucratic deliberation
recognize the need for congressional and presidential involve-
ment to prevent bureaucratic aggrandizement and to promote
public participation.205 Courts may also play a role in encourag-
ing bureaucratic deliberation and preventing possible abuses by
selfish agencies. 206 On the other hand, bureaucratic deliberation
may often be elitist, and frequently does not account for public
value. 20 7
Whether bureaucracies play a constructive role in fostering
democratic deliberation and participation, or serve their ovn
political ends or those of powerful interest groups depends upon
the agency's institutional structure, the composition of its staff, its
mission, and its relationship to the political branches. The re-
mainder of this Article will explore ways that agencies may play
a positive role in democratic deliberation and participation. In
particular, because of their superior substantive knowledge and
the failure of political institutions to represent the unborn, agen-
cies ought to play the lead role in encouraging public, congres-
sional and presidential consideration of the interests of future
generations.
D. Agency Independence
Since the 1960s, there has been a drastic shift in American
public administration, "from limited statutory mandates coupled
with considerable administrative discretion to sweeping statutory
204 See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1515, 1541, 1563-66, 1570-74;
Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interes4 and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946,
72 VA. L. REv. 271, 281-87 (1986).
MO5 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1516, 1550-54, 1564-65, 1570-72. Profes-
sor Sunstein also appears to be concerned about maintaining the primacy of
Congress. Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1937
B.Y.U. L. REv. 927, 941.
206 See, e.g., EDtmY, supra note 130, at 231 (arguing that courts should be
able to force agencies to consider regulatory alternatives using cost-benefit
analysis or scientific risk assessment methods if court believes agency analysis
would othervuise be deficient even if such requirements are somewhat intru-
sive); Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1547-50 (arguing in favor of judicial review
of agencies to ensure that agency interpreted statute in a deliberative manner).
This Article is more skeptical of the ability of courts to foster better decision-
making because of their limited knowledge of technical issues and tendency to
focus on procedural formalities.
M7 See Note, supra note 200, at 1417-18.
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mandates but increasingly restricted discretion. '208 The origin of
this shift is a fundamental change in prevailing American ideas
about governance, from the Progressive and New Deal belief in a
general public interest implemented by politically neutral profes-
sionals, to pluralist theories that there exists no general public
interest.209 Critics of agency discretion have contended that
agencies may not serve the public interest for at least three rea-
sons: first, regulated industries may "capture" the agency, espe-
cially if the agency must rely heavily upon industry data in
making decisions;210 second, agencies may be unduly influenced
by presidential politics and executive agendas, although others
argue that the President ought to take the lead role in directing
regulatory policies; 211 or third, agencies may develop their own
self-interested agendas, which may or may not serve any overall
public interest.212
The first criticism of greater agency discretion, that an
agency official may seek to favor a regulated industry to enhance
future employment opportunities within that industry, may not
be as serious as it may seem. Conflict of interest statutes limit
that possibility, professional staff are primarily recruited by in-
dustry based upon their knowledge of both technical issues and
the agency, and rigorous enforcement may actually increase in-
dustry's demand for the expertise of former government employ-
ees, 213 The danger of regulatory capture can be lessened or
eliminated by having the agency regulate a wide range of indus-
208 Andrews, supra note 35, at 544.
209 Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 106, at 26; Andrews, supra note 35, at
544.
210 Mank, supra note 166, at 34, 34 n.1, 49-52, 60-61 (discussing different defi-
nitions of capture as well as structural incentives and lack of time may allow
industry to dominate agency); Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1565-66 (potential
for agency capture by private interests). Industry may try to influence an
agency On issues that attract little public attention. See also BREYER, supra
note 28, at 50.
211 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 544; Robin Shifrin, Note, Not By Risk
Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 YALE L.J. 547, 556-58 (1992);
Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991,
at 162-66.
212 Andrews, supra note 35, at 544; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at
1563-65, 1570-71; Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Non-Market Failures, 55 Puu.
INTEREST 114, 126 (1979).
213 See generally Manic, supra 166, at 49-52, 80; Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at
1566.
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tries or interests rather than a single industry 214 The White
House2 5 or a new reviewing agency might supervise individual
agencies to prevent capture. Perhaps the greatest danger of cap-
ture comes from special interest groups lobbying Congress 16 or
White House staff2 17 to put pressure on agencies. Capture is less
likely to occur if there is public disclosure and competition
among interest groups.218 Courts might help to ensure that dis-
closure and public participation requirements are followed by
agencies2 19
The second danger, excessive presidential political influence,
can also be minimized in a number of ways. One way is to con-
vert executive agencies into independent regulatory commissions
whose commissioners may not be fired by the President, except
in statutorily defined circumstances.m 0 However, it is not clear
214 See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political
Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93-94 (1992) (ar-
guing Congress can reduce chances of agency capture by having agency regulate
several industries); Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1566 ("An agency organized
into distinct offices, each filled by professionals from different backgrounds who
communicate with a different clientele, can avoid decisions that reflect a single
industry's perspective").
215 Some commentators argue that the President, as the only nationally
elected-official, can prevent capture, but information costs, and the existence of
other factors mean that presidential elections are an imperfect means to elect a
person who will serve the public interest. See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at
1568-69. Moreover, the President can only imperfectly monitor the OMB and
other White House staff. See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1569.
216 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1567-68.
217 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
218 See generally Mank, supra note 166, at 49-52, 80; Seidenfeld, supra note
52, at 1567.
219 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1570. One must be somewhat skeptical,
however, of Professor Seidenfeld's view that courts could review whether agen-
cies are seeking to advance the "public interest" because, as Seidenfeld con-
cedes, that concept is often too amorphous to have judicially enforceable
meaning.
220 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (stating that President may remove the
seven members of the Federal Reserve Board "for cause"); 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e)
(1994) (stating that President may remove commissioners of Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office");
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (stating that the congres-
sional purpose in creating independent commission was to protect commission-
ers from presidential removal); A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE LJ. 787, at 787 nn.1-2 (1937) (dis-
cussing statutory restrictions on presidential power to remove commissioners of
independent regulatory commissions). In addition, the budgets of many in-
dependent regulatory commissions are exempt from prior OMB review before
being submitted to Congress. See Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordi-
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that independent commissions are always more independent
than executive agencies because the President usually selects the
chair of the commission.221
The third danger, that an agency will seek to follow its own
agenda at the expense of the public interest, is the most difficult
to resolve because risks exist from giving agencies too great or
too little independence. On the one hand, when agencies have
too little discretion they easily cave in to public pressure. 2 On
the other hand, when Congress refuses to set regulatory stan-
dards and delegates to an agency the task of balancing the costs
to industry against saving human lives, agencies may underregu-
late= because they are unwilling to make these controversial
choices in the absence of congressional direction.224 Addition-
ally, agency staff members may promote their own idiosyncratic
views rather than those in the public interest, and it will be diffi-
cult for reviewing courts to tell the difference.225 Simply giving
an agency discretion neither guarantees that the agency will ac-
tually engage in long-term planning and policy making without
guidance from Congress, nor prevents the agency from straying
far from the course Congress might want.2 26
nation of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 466
n.18 (1994) (discussing the budgetary process of several independent regulatory
commissions).
221 The chair often has greater practical authority than other commissioners.
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Pow-
ers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 590-1 (1984) (noting that
distinction between presidential authority over executive agencies and in-
dependent regulatory commissions is one of degree rather than kind).
2m Prop6nents of bureaucratic discretion have argued that the public and
Congress pressure agencies to spend too much money on well-publicized, but
low-risk health issues such as remediating toxic waste dumps than on less publi-
cized, but more dangerous issues such as indoor air pollution, including radon
gas. See BREYER, supra note 28, at 19, 23, 28, 67 (arguing resources should be
diverted from low-risk problems such as hazardous waste cleanups to higher
risk issues such as indoor smoke and pollution); but see Heinzerling, supra note
28, at 466-67 (arguing studies cited by Breyer are full of uncertainties and there-
fore it is not clear that the programs he would devote more resources to are any
more worthy than those the current risk regulating system selects).
23 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1563-65 (discussing problem of agency
lethargy).
224 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Regulation, 17 ECOL-
oGY L.Q. 233 (1990); Mank, supra note 53, at 314.
225 See Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1570-71.
226 One problem with regulatory flexibility is that an expert agency can al-
ways use uncertainty as an excuse to do nothing or to engage in endless intro-
spective analysis. Applegate, supra note 110, at 302-04 (discussing the
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Another problem with giving agencies greater deference is
the question of the constitutional appropriateness of congres-
sional delegation to administrative agencies.22 7 As a practical
matter, however, courts are unlikely to revitalize the nondelega-
tion doctrine because strict application of that principle would
invalidate numerous statutes.228 Accordingly, the real questions
concern types of issues which agencies possess greater institu-
tional competence to decide, and the degree to which Congress
ought to delegate authority to agencies.
There are ways to strike a balance between giving agencies
some flexibility to apply their expertise and providing appropri-
ate direction from Congress. Congress could make greater use of
"fuzzy bright line" statutes that set out upper or lower limits on
risk or cost, while giving an agency considerable flexibility in set-
ting regulations within congressional boundaries.229 An alterna-
tive approach that would also combine congressional direction
and agency discretion is to have Congress set priorities, goals, or
overall regulatory agendas rather than specific standards. 0
Most importantly, Congress needs to consider how to design an
organizational bureaucracy that has the freedom to address long-
term risk issues but also remains accountable to the public.
rationalist critique of technocratic decisionmaking, which doubts that flexibility,
without more, can ensure technocratically sensible results); Alyson C. Flounoy,
Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental
Decisionmaking, 15 HArv. ENvr. L. REv. 327 (1991).
227 See generally Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Compet-
ing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 419 (1937). Oppo-
nents of delegation often argue that vague delegations delegitimize
representative governance or suggest that statutory vagueness leads to an over-
all reduction in public welfare. But see Stewart, supra note 53, at 328-43 (argu-
ing that delegation is appropriate, but that the political branches could greatly
improve efficiency by directing agencies to use economic incentives rather than
centralized prescriptive regulation).
228 Since 1937, courts have usually refused to invoke the delegation doctrine
to invalidate broad congressional delegations of power to agencies, concluding
such questions ought to be resolved through political mechanisms of represen-
tative government. Stewart, supra note 53, at 326.
22 Mank, supra note 53, at 267, 300-02, 309-13, 344.
230 For toxic substances, Congress could direct an agency to achieve the
greatest overall risk reduction possible within the budget allocated to the
agency, or to attack situations involving the maximum risk or the lowest margi-
nal cost of reduction. Congress could also indicate general preferences, such as
breadth versus depth: a statute might direct an agency to remedy many
problems at least superficially or to solve a few completely. See Applegate,
supra note 110, at 281-82, 304-05, 330-36, 346, 352-53.
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A PROPOSED SUPERAGENCY
The organizational design and structure of an agency largely
determines its performance and its accountability to the pub-
lic.231 To improve long-term environmental planning and to pro-
tect future generations, Congress should create a Superagency
with considerable technical expertise to address problems such as
global warming. To some extent, the Superagency would take
the lead in developing paternalistic policies to protect future gen-
erations and might even, to the extent it has discretion, occasion-
ally act in a countermajoritarian way. To promote deliberative
dialogue with different interest groups, members of the Super-
agency ought to circulate among various governmental entities
and should conduct public discussion fora to determine public
interest and to educate the general public.
A. Previous Proposals
Previous proposals to improve environmental decisionmak-
ing have failed to address the interests of future generations. The
proposed Superagency would have explicit authority to act upon
their behalf, and thus would represent a different approach.232
1. Yellin's Executive-Legislative Commission
Joel Yellin has proposed the creation of an environmental
advisory commission that would include executive and legislative
branch decisionmakers, in addition to experts from outside gov-
ernment, to review environmental programs and to address areas
in which scientific knowledge and technical data are incom-
plete.2 3 3 The commission would recommend policy changes and
231 See Macey, supra note 214, at 93-94, 99-109 (arguing that Congress can
strongly influence an agency's long-term behavior by establishing the agency's
organizational structure and jurisdiction). But see Jonathan R. Macey, Sepa-
rated Powers and Positive Political Theory. The Tug of War Over Administrative
Agencies, 80 GEo. L. 671, 674-75, 702-03 (1992) (acknowledging that the ini-
tial establishment of an administrative agency's organizational structure and ju-
risdictional parameters is not conclusive; both the judiciary and the President
have independent influence over an agency).
232 See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
233 Under Yellin's proposal, the President would appoint a commission that
would include the chairpersons of the Council for Environmental Quality and
the Council of Economic Advisors, the president of the National Academy of
Sciences, the Attorney General, and selected members of Congress. The com-
mission would also include rotating representatives from the biological sciences,
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submit proposals on updating environmental statutes to the rele-
vant congressional committees. Its enabling legislation would in-
clude procedures to assure floor consideration of its proposals
during the year in which they are presented to Congress.2-
Yellin's proposed commission would have only an advisory
role so it could not exercise excessive executive power or assume
responsibilities properly belonging to courtsP.5 Yellin states that
his suggestion for a hybrid commission is motivated by the suc-
cess of previous ad hoc commissions assigned to address specific
issues. 3 6 To some extent, these commissions were successful in
depoliticizing issues by serving as an informal bargaining mecha-
nism outside the public eyePZ- 7 It is unlikely, however, that any
commission or agency facing broad risk regulation issues can es-
cape political forcesss
Reforming environmental decisionmaking and addressing
long-term issues requires a commission or agency with substan-
tial resources, time, and commitment. Yellin's proposed commis-
sion lacks sufficient authority and resources to make such
reforms. It is also questionable whether, for instance, the Attor-
physical sciences, and engineering communities. The agency heads concerned
with a particular issue such as the environment or worker safety would sit as ad
hoc commission members during deliberations on an issue within their jurisdic-
tion. See Yellin, supra note 106, at 1327-28.
234 Yellin, supra note 106, at 1327. Other commentators have proposed simi-
lar procedures. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND Its R ORiw 366
(1982); Gouvin, supra note 7, at 490-91 (citing sources).
235 Yellin, supra note 106, at 1327 nn.161, 164 (discussing and attempting to
address potential objections to hybrid executive-legislative commissions raised
by Guno CALABRESI, A COMIMON LA= FOR THE AGE OF STATuTES 60-65
(1982) (arguing that hybrid executive-legislative commision for updating stat-
utes would either exercise unchecked executive power or take on responsibili-
ties properly belonging to courts).
236 Yellin cites the following examples: (1) the Warren Commission on Pres-
dent Kennedy's assassination; (2) the Kerner Commission on civil disorders,
including race riots and antiwar protest, in 1968; (3) the Social Security Com-
mission that reported on the system's funding and future; and (4) the Scowcroft
Commission report on the MX missile system. Yellin, supra note 106, at 1327
n.163.
237 The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has been fairly
successful in addressing the politically sensitive issue of closing military bases, a
task that Congress found too politically difficult to set criteria for or to accom-
plish itself. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information
as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MicH. L. REv. 917, 952-53 &
n.121 (1990); Seidenfeld, supra note 52, at 1542..
238 See generally Gouvin, supra note 7, at 488 (arguing that attempts to de-
politicize risk regulation will fail).
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ney General, the chairperson of the Council of Economic Advi-
sors, or important members of Congress would really have the
time or interest to explore complex scientific issues each year. A
different type of commission or agency is needed that would have
substantive powers to issue or review regulations and an admin-
istrator or commissioner whose primary job would be to decide
scientific and environmental policy questions.
2. Shifrin's Congressional Experts
Robin Shifrin has criticized proposals for risk-based priority-
setting on the grounds that they will unduly increase the power
of agency scientists and the executive branch in general.239 In-
stead, she proposes a vaguely described "bilateral delegation"
process by which the congressional environmental science com-
mittee would set research priorities with input from congres-
sional and executive science agencies and deference to the advice
of congressional scientific staff.240
Shifrin's proposal fails to address the fundamental problem
of the fragmented congressional committee system. Shifrin does
not demonstrate how congressional committees or staff could in-
clude more opportunities for public input or perform better than
EPA has as part of its attempts to set priorities.241 A further
drawback to the proposal is that congressional oversight often
results in micromanagement of agencies and subjects them to
conflicting, demands from different committees that are not nec-
essarily representative of Congress and may be less accountable
to the public than the Administrator of EPA. Additionally; the
electoral cycle and budget process lead Congress to focus largely
on short-term issues. Shifrin expresses fear of giving the exdcu-
tive too much power, but fails to make a convincing case that
239 Shifrin, supra note 211, at 556-64.
240 Shifrin argues that "[b]ilateral delegation would shift power in the Execu-
five away from OMB to EPA and its [Office of Research and Development]
ORD and [Science Advisory Board] SAB, and in Congress, away from the ap-
propriations committees to the environmental science committees, with possi-
ble contributions from the congressional Office of Technology Assessment(OTA)." Shifrin, supra note 211, at 566. But see Andrews, supra note 97, at
524 n.37 (criticizing Shifrin's proposal because of its vagueness and failure to
specify "what such a 'bilateral delegation' would involve as a specific legal
procedure").
241 See Andrews, supra note 35, at 524 n.37.
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bilateral delegation to congressional experts would produce bet-
ter regulatory results.242
There are more effective ways to integrate congressional and
executive environmental decisionmaking. For instance, members
of congressional and executive staffs might exchange places to
gain a deeper understanding of both substantive issues and pro-
cedural routines in the other branch of government without in-
terfering with each's autonomy. Such exchanges would have
greater impact in an agency in which rotation and breadth of ex-
perience among different agencies was crucial in achieving senior
policymaking positions.
3. Breyer's Civil Service Elite
In his 1993 book, Breaking the Vicious Circle, Judge, now
Justice, Breyer proposes to create a centralized executive branch
agency, group, or council that would be responsible for oversee-
ing and reviewing all environmental and health regulations. He
sharply criticizes existing regulatory programs and argues that
public ignorance of risk issues, congressional overreaction to
public fears, and the tendency of regulatory agencies to bow to
public opinion and political pressures creates a "vicious circle"
that often leads to regulatory overkill by agencies.24 3 Breyer,
however, believes that regulatory agencies are the "weakest
point" in the vicious circle, and suggests they are more capable of
being reformed than Congress.2"
Breyer contends that existing health and environmental
agencies do not have sufficient discretion or expertise, and pro-
poses to create an elite reviewing body of civil servants within the
executive branch to coordinate risk regulation, using the French
Conseil d'Etat as a model.2 45 He discusses the need to provide
such a group with civil service tenure to insulate them from pub-
lic opinion and with significant career rewards to attract highly
242 See Shiffin, supra note 211, at 566-68 ("In order to prevent the increase of
executive influence over scientific matters, authority for risk based priority set-
ting should not be delegated solely to specialists in the Executive."). But see
Andrews, supra note 97, at 524 n37 (arguing that the "underlying theme, of
[Shifrn's] article seems limited to fear of any increase in executive influence.").
243 BPREYR, supra note 28, at 42-51.
244 See BREYER, supra note 28, at 55 ("Any practical, institutionally oriented
solution must also take account of the extreme difficulty of changing human
psychology, press reactions, or Congressional politics.").
245 BREYER, supra note 28, at 59-60.
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qualified staff members.2 46 Following the Conseil's model, he
would enhance the capabilities of the proposed agency's staff by
rotating them through several governmental institutions.247
Even some critics of his overall proposal have reacted favorably
to the rotation scheme and the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB has already announced plans
to begin such a program.248 Breyer's centralized group would
possess: multidisciplinary expertise, thus correcting OMB's over-
emphasis on economics and relative lack of scientific expertise;
an increased ability to mqke interagency comparisons, set priori-
ties, and implement transfers; greater insulation from single
agency politics; and perhaps a clearer nmission.249 Breyer argues
that a centralized risk management group, council, or agency
would be able to address the likely risk-related impact of future
scientific changes better than existing agencies.250
Breyer's proposed bureaucratic elite would have interagency
jurisdiction, political insulation, prestige, and authority unprece-
dented in American history.251 As examples, Breyer points to
the OIRA and the Conseil, but neither has authority to deter-
mine substantive regulatory policies.2 52 He acknowledges that
the American public's skepticism toward government will make
it difficult to provide our civil servants with the authority and
246 BREYER, supra note 28, at 61-62. In particular, staff members might enjoy
a special civil service career path that would enable members to work in line
agencies such as EPA or in Congressional committees and then back to the
group to enable the staff to develop scientific and political expertise. BREYrER,
supra note 28, at 61-62.
247 BREYER, supra note 28, at 70-71.
M4 See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 87 (criticizing Breyer's overall
proposal but finding merit in the rotation proposal).
249 BREYER, supra note 28, at 68.
250 BREYER, supra note 28, at 67. For example, medical research advances
are increasingly enabling scientists and physicians to identify particular groups
of persons who are genetically predisposed to develop cancer when exposed to
certain chemicals. BREYER, supra note 28, at 67, 118 nA0 (citing sources). The
group could consider creative, cost-effective alternatives to traditional pollution
control regulation such as genetic counseling.
251 See David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a
Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REv. 365, 372 (1994).
252 See BREYER, supra note 28, at 68-72; Dana, supra note 251, at 372.
Breyer concedes, "Of course, America is not France; nor are the substantive
problems of risk regulation exactly the same as the problems of administrative
regularity, legality, and efficacy that typically face the Conseil d'Etat." BREYER,
supra note 28, at 71.
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prestige of the French civil servants that he admires so greatly.253
Breyer suggests that his proposed group might take over the role
of OIRA, or, alternatively, that OIRA might be enhanced by ad-
ding scientifically or substantively trained experts to work with
existing policy analysts and economists2- 4
While Breyer's assessment of how well the public and Con-
gress understands risk assessment issues has considerable merit,
his solution, as well as that of many other technocrats, under-
plays the need for public legitimacy and participation by placing
such important risk decisions within a small cadre of experts- 55
Arguably, Breyer's small elite is more vulnerable to capture by
special interest groups precisely because it would deliberately be
insulated from public pressures.25 6 Breyer never fully addresses
how his elite will escape the political pressures that created the
vicious circle in the first place.25 7 Finally, Breyer offers no con-
vincing evidence that an elite agency with a small staff would out-
perform existing agencies in addressing uncertain risks.2 s
Breyer is at pains to refute the objection that his proposal is
undemocratic, arguing that the existence of a single centralized
agency could facilitate democratic control by reducing a mass of
individual decisions to a smaller number of policy choices that
Congress or the public could more easily understand, and for
which the public could hold the executive branch accontable.2 9
253 BREYR, supra note 28, at 63, 70-72 (acknowledging the American pub-
lie's skepticism toward government authority, but discussing ways to develop
bureaucratic elite similar to French Conseil d'Etat).
Z4 BRYER, supra note 28, at 71-72, 79.
255 See Adam M. Fnkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagno-
sis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Wicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENvrL.
LJ. 295, 356-57 (1994) (arguing Breyer's proposal would concentrate power in
a small elite and thereby undermine public participation in environmental deci-
sionmaking); Mank, supra note 31, at 372-73 (observing public participation is
important as a value in itself, a means of developing a broader administrative
record, and a means of lessening the risk that special interests will capture an
agency).
256 See Fmkel, supra note 255, at 356-57.
257 See Gouvin, supra note 7, at 482-83 (arguing Breyer fails to address public
choice criticisms of political process).
25s See Fnkel, supra note 255, at 357 (arguing that Breyer presents no evi-
dence how his proposed elite will outperform existing agencies); Dana, supra
note 251, at 381-83 (criticizing Breyer's proposal for underestimating value
judgments inherent in risk assessment).
259 He argues:
[T]he proposal takes no power from Congress. The Executive Branch
currently exercises the power that any such group would possess, but does
so in a disorganized, somewhat random way. Chaos is not democracy; to
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Breyer, however, prefers that elite bureaucrats address most reg-
ulatory issues without any public debate and the success of his
proposal apparently depends upon eliminating the public from
most issues: "[N]ot every risk-related matter need become a
public issue. A depoliticized regulatory process might produce
better results, hence increased confidence, leading to more
favorable public and Congressional reactions. ' 260 Breyer some-
times acknowledges that public values ought to be considered,
but he gives too little attention as to iow elite decisionmaking
might be harmonized with the recognition of these values and
how democratic deliberation and consensus-building might have
positive societal benefits that go beyond increasing regulatory
efficiency.261
In addiiion, Breyer does not sufficiently address how presi-
dential politics might distort decisionmaking in the White House
or agencies. He is critical of OMB's current lack of scientific ex-
pertise and also points out the weaknesses of the Council and
Office of Science Advisor, but he suggests placing his proposed
elite within OMB. 262 The protection of future generations, how-
ever, may require a bureaucratic elite both more independent
from the White House and closer to the people.
B. A Proposal for a Superagency
The Superagency that this Article proposes Congress estab-
lish would not only possess the interagency coordinating charac-
teristics discussed by Breyer, but would also engage in public
deliberation about how to protect future generations. To accom-
organize rationally the exercise of power may mean its better, but not its
greater, exercise.
BREYER, supra note 28, at 73. Furthermore, he states:
[T]he existence of a single, rationalizing group of administrators can thus
facilitate democratic control, for it would reduce a mass of individual de-
cisions to a smaller number of policy choices, publicize the criteria used to
make those choices, and thereby make it easier for Congress, or the pub-
lic, to understand what the Executive Branch is doing and why.
BREYER, supra note 28, at 73-74.
260 BREYER, supra note 28, at 55-56.
261 See generally Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 89 (arguing that
Breyer's proposal does not adequately address how to incorporate public judg-
ments about risk).
262 BREYER, supra note 28, at 68-72; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 108
(proposing to give OMB authority over long-range research and regulatory
coordination).
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plish this goal, the Superagency would need considerable inde-
pendence and sensitivity to popular values.
Even if the Superagency is an executive agency, there are
ways to increase its independence from presidential control. At
a minimum, the Superagency should supplant the OMB's role in
reviewing environmental regulations, and not be subject to OMB
review. In addition, if politically feasible, the Superagency
should be led by bipartisan commissioners serving staggered
terms so that a President would not be able to appoint all the
commissioners in a single term. While the President should be
able to choose the chair of the Superagency, the President's re-
moval power should be minimal so that partisan removals are
either limited or disfavored. Furthermore, members of the
Superagency's staff would circulate among the staffs of important
congressional leaders, the Executive Office of the President, and
substantive government agencies.263 Such rotation should in-
crease the staff's political influence and its understanding of pop-
ular values.
As long as the Superagency regularly reports to Congress,
perhaps every two years, Congress should give the Superagency
considerable discretion to change the priorities of individual
agencies based on the types of problems that are anticipated in
the future, possible solutions, and their distributional and eco-
nomic consequences. 26 The Superagency would provide a com-
prehensive ranking of long-term problems in order of their
significance and would suggest which problems should be ad-
dressed first in light of competing policy justifications265 such as
absolute risk, cost-effectiveness, the availability of information,
distributional consequences, and other factors. Given the uncer-
tainties of risk assessment and the consequences of present ac-
tions on the future, the Superagency might make decisions based
upon reasonable estimates and develop policies based upon the
263 Another interesting question is whether fellows from industry, universi-
ties, or public interest groups should serve for either short or long periods in
government programs. Professor Bromley, former Science Advisor to Presi-
dent Bush, argues that overly strict conflict-of-interest rules have made it in-
creasingly difficult for members of private industry to serve as White House
fellows. See BROMLEY, supra note 94, at 47-48. While there are dangers from
conflicts-of-interest, government ought to encourage mid-career fellows from
private industry to provide insights into., industry science, organization, and
political viewpoints.
264 See Applegate, supra note 110, at 305 (discussing short-term planning).
265 Applegate, supra note 110, at 310 (discussing priority setting).
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relative risk of chemicals rather than confront the more difficult
task of establishing absolute standards of risk.266 Before promul-
gation, the plan would be subject to limited judicial review, and
to possible legislative revision.2 67 Finally, the plan would be
binding during the period of its operation unless the Superagency
issued a report to the President and Congress justifying a change
based upon an emergency or significant new information.26
Congress should specifically authorize the Superagency to
represent future generations in courts or on siting committees.
In charitable trust law, the attorney general serves as the protec-
tor of the public for whom the trust was established.269 By anal-
ogy, a public official could represent or appoint a trustee or
guardian ad litem to represent future generations in courts.270
While existing agencies could perform this task, the Superagency
would possess specific statutory authority and would develop
special competence. In addition, the Superagency could appoint
representatives for future generations to serve on local siting ne-
gotiation boards to determine whether to accept a hazardous fa-
cility and to negotiate compensation from the developer.271 To
monitor the Superagency's success in protecting future genera-
tions, Congress could appoint an ombudsman to receive com-
plaints and to conduct performance investigations.272
C. Paternalism and Countermajoritarianism
This Article proposes to give the Superagency at least lim-
ited paternalistic or countermajoritarian powers to protect future
generations, and possibly present-day minority groups, from un-
wise depletion of resources or degradation of the environment.
266 Applegate, supra note 110, at 324-28.
267 Applegate, supra note 110, at 310.
268 Applegate, supra note 110, at 310. Courts have routinely determined
whether or not a workplace hazard is an emergency or not. Applegate, supra
note 110, at 310 n.161, 345 n.378. (citing cases).
269 See, Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and In-
tergenerational Equity, 11 EcoLoGY L.Q. 495, at 566 (1984).
270 See Weiss, supra note 269, at 565-66. The terms "guardian ad litem" and
"trustee" are used to refer to the group or individual who would be authorized
to represent the interests of future generations in a lawsuit. Wlile the terms
"guardian ad litem" and "trustee" provide useful analogies, they would not be
subject to all of the formalities of traditional trust or family law. Weiss, supra
note 269, at 566 n.314.
271 Mank, supra note 31, at 413-18..
272 Weiss, supra note 269, at 572-76.
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These powers would be tempered by statutory language requir-
ing the Superagency to engage in public deliberation.
1. Agency Countermajoritarianism
Legal scholars have written extensively about what Profes-
sor Alexander Bickel called "the countermajoritarian difficulty"
with judicial review.273 While semi-independent administrative
agencies clearly cannot overturn or refuse to enforce a statute
enacted by Congress, Congress could specifically authorize
countermajoritarian decisionmaking in specified circumstances,
or, alternatively, deliberately make a statute ambiguous so as to
leave room for administrative discretion under the Chevron doc-
trine.2 W Because an agency does not possess the judicial author-
ity to invoke the Constitution to overturn a majoritarian
decision, the agency must pursue Professor Bickel's strategy of
gaining majoritarian support in the foreseeable future for its de-
cisions.275 An agency cannot get too far ahead of the public and
must sustain long-term public support,276 but there is a place for
government officials to take a leadership role in convincing the
public that policies that protect minorities or future generations
are important.
One way the Superagency could take such a leadership posi-
tion would be to hold public hearings and to receive public
comments before taking major actions so that any
countermajoritarian actions are preceded by extensive public di-
alogue and attempts at consensus-building.
273 See ALEXANDER BicKmc, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLics 16 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining "The
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty": "[t]he root difficulty is that judicial review is
a countermajoritarian force in our system."); LAuENcE H. TRiBE, AMERiCAN
CONS-nTUTIONAL LAW, § 1-7, at 10-12 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing "an-
timajoritarian difficulty"); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elec-
tive Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Cki. L. REv. 689, 711-12, 765-78
(1995) (discussing representation-oriented models of judicial review).
274 Statutes are often ambiguous and Chevron requires courts to defer to an
agency's permissible construction of an ambiguous statute, and therefore an
agency often has some policy discretion. See supra notes 61-66 and accompany-
ing text.
275 See generally BicKi-, supra note 273, at 24 passin; Croley, supra note
273, at 766 (arguing that Bickel, in THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra
note 273, justified countermajoritarian judicial review as a temporary check un-
til courts could-gain support from new majority).
276 See generally Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 293.
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Since some minority interests, such as industry groups, are
well represented, and some diffuse majority interests, such as en-
vironmental protection, are poorly represented,2 77 the Super-
agency should seek to promote both minority and majority
interests that are likely to be underrepresented in democratic de-
liberation. Moreover, although the environmental justice move-
ment has 'shown that certain minority groups often live in
disproportionately polluted areas and suggests that existing agen-
cies do not sufficiently address their concerns,278 the existing
political process has acted to some extent to address these envi-
ronmental disparities. Some minority groups have at least some
say in the environmental decisionmaking process.2 79 EPA is be-
ginning to consider possil~le disproportionate impacts on minori-
ties and -low-income communities when it issues permits.28 0
Accordingly, the Superagency may want to focus on an even
more underrepresented group, future generations, whose inter-
ests have received much less recent attention than those of mi-
nority groups.
There are practical limitations on how strongly an agency
ought to act to protect future generations. Given the uncertain-
ties of scientific predictions, a Superagency probably should not
try to convince the present generation to make huge sacrifices for
a distant benefit. Nevertheless, a Superagency could try to per-
suade people to avoid creating substantial risks of future disas-
ter.281 Because most types of pollution or resource depletion
that have long-term effects, such as global warming or the de-
struction of stratospheric ozone, are also likely to have a signifi-
cant short-term impact, an agency might focus on convincing the
277 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "In-
juries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 218-20 (1992).
278 See generally Mank, supra note 31, at 334-44.
279 President Clinton has signed Executive Order 12,898, which requires all
-federal agencies to investigate to what- extent their policies may create environ-
mental inequities in minority or low-income populations. Exec. Order No.
12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). During the 103d Congress, in which the Dem-
ocratic Party controlled the House and Senate, a number of environmental jus-
tice bills were introduced, although none was passed. See Mank, supra note 31,
at 351-57.
280 See In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana Inc., RCRA Appeal
Nos. 95-2 & 95-3, 1995 WL 395962 (EPA), (U.S. E.P.A. Envtl. App. Bd. June
29, 1995) (holding EPA has discretion to consider environmental justice factors
in issuing RCRA permit, but that agency did not err in issuing permit despite
petitioner's claims of disproportionate impact).
281 See Farber'& Hemmersbaugh, supra note 1, at 294-95.
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public to alter short-term behavior and thereby indirectly avoid
long-term problems.
2. -Paternalism and Environmentalism
There has been considerable controversy about the defini-
tion of paternalism, but it usually involves an action by A to ben-
efit B that A would carry out regardless of whether B has
consented to it.2n Since John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty, lib-
eral philosophers have argued that political authority should
avoid acts of paternalism. This liberal tradition has generally dis-
trusted paternalistic legislation,283 although that aversion has
weakened somewhat since the New Deal. In addition, one may
legitimately question whether administrative agencies are institu-
tionally competent to exercise paternalistic authority.284 While
paternalism is normally at odds with civic republican ideals of
deliberation and consensus-building, paternalism is essential to
promote the public good for future generations.
The Superagency could act paternalistically to protect cur-
rent vulnerable minorities because short-term paternalism is nec-
essary to protect certain minority or low-income communities
from the disproportionate siting of hazardous facilities; these
groups often lack sufficient education to understand the risks of
such facilities, and have insufficient resources to address the
problem of disproportionate impact on their own.25s Other com-
282 See David Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L REv.
519, 522-23 (1988). Paternalism should be distinguished from self-paternalism,
as in Greek mythology where Odysseus supposedly tied himself to the mast in
order to navigate past the sirens to prevent himself from giving into temptation
at a future time. Id at 523-24.
2M3 SAGO E, supra note 8, at 64; Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and
He is US or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENrL L
283, 301 (1982); Shapiro, supra note 282, at 519; Eleanor N. Metzger, Comment,
Driving the Environmental Justice Movement Forwardi" The Need for a Paternal-
istic Approach, 45 CASE W. RrS. L. REv. 379, 379 (1994).
284 One of the few existing examples of administrative paternalism is the au-
thority of the Social Security Administration to pay benefits to friends, rela-
tives, or qualified organizations when the "interest of [the beneficiary] would be
served thereby .... " See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994); Margaret G.
Farrell, Administrative Paternalism: Social Security's Representative Payment
Program and Two Models of Justice, 14 CARDozo L. PEv. 284-98 (1992); Sha-
piro, supra note 282, at 520 (discussing relationship between institutional com-
petence and appropriateness of judicial as opposed to legislative paternalism).
2M5 This commentator justifies paternalistic legislation on the grounds that
"[i]n the environmental justice arena, the group being regulated is incapacitated
in the sense that they lack the requisite information and education needed to
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mentators, on the other hand, have argued that developing a
community-based political movement is superior to relying upon
paternalistic statutes or government agencies. 28 6 Paternalistic
legislation or government action may actually harm minorities if
such measures prevent the siting in minority areas of hazardous
facilities that bring greater benefits than risks.287
Voting or educational reforms, however, could better en-
hance the ability of minority or low-income communities to as-
sess whether or not to accept a hazardous facility than
government paternalism.288 Federal or state agencies should act
paternalistically only as a last resort to prohibit the siting of haz-
ardous facilities in areas where there is already an excessive risk
to human health.289
In one sense, paternalism in favor of protecting future gen-
erations raises difficult problems because we do not know what
the preferences of our children and grandchildren will be.2 9o Yet,
we must recognize that our decisions today will determine who
they will be and will significantly influence what preferences they
effectively cure environmental inequities." See Metzger, supra note 283, at 397.
Even this commentator states that her proposed paternalistic legislation should
be evaluated periodically and that "once the basis for an effective non-paternal-
istic approach is in place, governments should cease in their role as decision-
makers, and continue only in their role as educators, and resource providers."
Metzger, supra note 283, at 397-98.
286 See generally Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Means to Environmen-
tal Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOoY L.Q.
619 (1992).
287 The existence of racial disparities in the siting of polluting facilities is dif-
ferent from the presence of purely negative disparities in job markets or the
provision of municipal services because these facilities typically bring both ben-
efits in the form of jobs and taxes as well as environmental harms. See Mank,
supra note 31, at 332-33, 398 passim; see also Johnine J. Brown, Chasing the
"Tail" of Environmental Racism; Who is the Pit Bull?, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
10, 1994, at 10 (noting that the federal government's initiative on environmental
equity is paternalistic and "predictably wrong-footed: it will make it harder, if
not impossible, to do business in poor and minority neighborhoods").
288 For instance, federal, state or local governments could adopt electoral re-
forms such as the use of weighted proportional or cumulative voting to provide
fair representation of minorities or high-risk residents in electing a local siting
committee that can negotiate whether or not to accept a facility and the appro-
priate level of compensation from a facility owner. See Mank, supra note 31, at
413 n.495. In addition, the government or developers could fund technical
assistance grants to place residents on a more level playing field with develop-
ers or government officials. Mank, supra note 31, at 409 n.474.
289 Mank, supra note 31, at 401-06.
290 See Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public In-
terest, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1021, 1027-28 (1989).
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will have.29' Thus, any reasonable policy we may choose is likely
to find acceptance with the future we create.292
Society cannot simply rely upon the market to make long-
term decisions. Many natural resources or beauties are public
goods whose market value is not easily estimated,2 93 and there-
fore economic efficiency alone is not a sufficient criterion upon
which to base decisions about resource allocations and usage.; 94
Decisions about long-term public projects require agencies to se-
lect the appropriate discount rate in determining whether these
projects are worthwhile, but OMB's lack of scientific expertise
raises questions about its ability to evaluate the total impact of
environmental regulations on both the present and the future.Z95
Thus, the government cannot avoid making value judgments
about the future.
The preservation of wilderness requires at least some pater-
nalistic decisions by the present generation on behalf of the fu-
ture. Professor Ronald Dworkin, who generally espouses a
liberal philosophy at odds with paternalism, has suggested that
the preservation of wilderness is necessary to allow future gener-
ations the moral opportunity to establish their own values, in-
cluding environmental values, and therefore that preserving the
environment for future generations may not only be "consistent"
with liberalism, "but in fact sponsored by it."296 Mark Sagoff ar-
gues that paternalism is inevitable with respect to future genera-
tions because the only way to provide them with wilderness is to
restrict current development and that the consequences of doing
so will have an impact on the "character of future individuals,
their environment, and their values." 297
Society cannot avoid shaping the preferences and environ-
ment of future generations, and therefore should do the best job
possible. A Superagency with the techno-bureaucratic virtues
291 SAGOFF, supra note 8, at 63-66; Farber, supra note 290, at 1028 n31;
Sagoff, supra note 283, at 301-02.
292 SAGOFF, supra note 8, at 63-66.
293 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
294 See generally SAGOFF, supra note 8, at 8-9, 17-18, 26-29, 114-18, 225-26
nn.2-13, 228-30 nn.6-27 (arguing against economic efficiency and in favor of en-
vironmental values and citing sources for economic position); Farber, supra
note 290, at 1021-24.
295 See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
296 See Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in Putmac AND PRrvAT'E MORALrrY
113, 141-42 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
297 SAGOFF, supra note 8, at 64-65; Sagoff, supra note 283, at 302.
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that Breyer describes and a broad public understanding of envi-
ronmental issues is the best model for setting future priorities.
D. Potential Dangers of Bureaucratic Elitism
There has been considerable debate about whether a scien-
tific elite or the government should control scientific decision-
making.298 The fundamental premise of scientific thinking is
based upon finding the best or truest among competing ideas and
therefore is at odds with "the American political tradition, which
is premised on the theory that all ideas should be approached
skeptically." 299 If scientific problems could be separated from
political ones, there would be a good case for the creation of new
institutions such as science courts that would allow scientific ex-
perts to make decisions largely free from popular control.300
In most important regulatory problems, however, there is an
inevitable interrelationship between scientific and political issues
and the tools of analytical rationality are too narrow to address
the complex nature of such problems. Accordingly, some argue
that we should rely on political decisionmakers to make regula-
,tory decisions despite their limited ability to assess scientific in-
formation. This system would preserve democratic control even
though it may be somewhat inefficient.301 Arguably, politicians
make the final decisions about economics, diplomacy, and mili-
tary strategy even though there are experts in each of these
fields; therefore, we should treat science the same way.30
Some commentator§ have argued that the environmental
movement is becoming less dominated by scientific and govern-
ment experts and more influenced by popular activism, especially
at the local and state levels.30 3 These scholars might argue that
the Superagency proposal is too elitist and that citizen activism
can address the needs of future generations. While there is cer-
tainly a role for popular participation in addressing long-term
problems, it is not clear that the general public is as interested in
long-term issues as it is in short-term ones. Moreover, the public
298 Carter, supra note 142, at 1337-41.
299 Carter, supra note 142, at 1337.
300 Carter, supra note 142, at 1337-38; Yellin, supra note 106, at 1307-16.
301 Carter, supra note 142, at 1337-39.
32 Carter, supra note 142, at 134041.
303 See generally W. Douglas Costain & James P. Lester, The Evolution of
Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLTCS & POLICY 34-6 (James P. Les-
ter ed., 2d ed. 1995); Rushefsky, supra note 194, at 296.
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lacks the technical expertise to predict long-term consequences
without the assistance of scientific elites. Furthermore, the pub-
lic sometimes has a short attention span when dealing with cer-
tain issues, although environmentalism in general has been
receiving consistent public attention. For instance, during the
summer of 1988, there was a rapid increase in popular concern
about global warming, but there was a relative decline by the
early 1990s as the mass media shifted attention to other issues.304
While popular participation and elite decisionmaking are often
seen as being at odds, the Superagency could increase popular
interest in long-term environmental issues by conducting media
and educational campaigns.
Environmental public interest groups such as the Sierra
Club are not an adequate substitute for a Superagency. These
groups generally lack the resources to investigate complex tech-
nical problems. While environmental groups can help educate
citizens, the government potentially has the resources and orga-
nizational infrastructure to reach a broader portion of the public.
Additionally, it is questionable whether public interest groups
have standing to represent future generations. Finally, conserva-
tive critics often charge that environmental groups are elitist be-
cause their membership is concentrated among upper-middle-
class professionals and that the leaders of these groups often hold
extreme political views.3 05 The growth of the environmental jus-
tice movement and other local citizen environmental groups has
arguably made the environmental movement less elitist,.3 0 and
the fact that environmental groups are repeat players in the polit-
ical marketplace means that they have an incentive to present
honest information. Nevertheless, there is evidence that govern-
mental elites have views that correspond better to the views of
claimed constituencies than do the leaders of interest group
elites,307 and that suggests that government bureaucracies may be
more representative and accountable to the public than environ-
mental public interest groups.
304 See Sheldon Ungar, The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as
a Social Problem, 33 Soc. Q. 483, 496-97 (1992).
305 See Rushefsky, supra note 194, at 287-95 (summarizing recent political
science literature on environmental elites).
306See Costain & Lester, supra note 303, at 35-36; Rushefsky, supra note
194, at 296.
307 See Rushefsky, supra note 194, at 293.
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This Article proposes a synthesis of elite and public deci-
sionmaking. The staff of the proposed Superagency would circu-
late among the Executive Office of the President and Congress
to gain a better understanding of the political process and would
consider public values such as avoiding involuntary risks along
with more quantitative approaches to risk assessment.3 08 There
would be extensive opportunities for public participation and ed-
ucation.30 9 Nevertheless, Congress would give the Superagency
the mission of protecting future generations, requiring it to take
the lead in protecting the future, and even, in exceptional cases,
resisting majoritarian sentiments. 310
Undoubtedly, there are dangers in elitism. There is the dan-
ger that science may be controlled politically to predict or deny
certain environmental problems or to sustain present action or
win larger budgets.31' One possible way to minimize the politi-
calization of the Superagency is to have other agencies or univer-
sities actually conduct long-term research and to limit the role of
the Superagency to supervising such research. Civilian university
research might provide the benefit of outside perspectives, pro-
vided the researchers do not sycophantically follow the views of
the funding agency. Furthermore, research on long-term issues
ought to be subjected to independent peer review by scientists
outside of a given agency to make the process more objective.312
If the Superagency's budget is not dependent upon the results of
the research, then it will have less reason to exaggerate long-term
environmental risks. In addition, the Superagency would be less
likely to use science for political reasons if it is headed by biparti-
san commissioners, even if it is an executive agency.3 13 Never-
theless, the possibility that the Superagency could act in a self-
308 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
309 See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
311 Christenson, supra note 2, at 395; see also RONALD BAILEY, ECO-SCAM
119-21, 134-35 (1993) (arguing that the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration exaggerated the dangers from the destruction of stratospheric ozone to
win larger research budgets).
312 Some proponents of regulatory reform propose subjecting agency risk as-
sessment and cost-benefit analyses to outside peer review. See Graham, supra
note 64, at 64. Absent any time constraints, peer review makes sense, but it
may be unwise in some cases if it unnecessarily delays the issuance of important
regulations. For long-term issues, there is usually more time to study an issue,
and therefore outside peer review should be the norm.
313 See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
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serving manner remains. Ultimately, democratic processes such
as congressional oversight and public disclosure are needed to
maintain a balance between scientific expertise and popular val-
ues. Because scientific hypotheses must be replicated and ac-
cepted by a critical peer group, science in a democratic society is
more likely to prevent empowered elites from ;achieving self-
serving results than to serve as a subtle means of elite control 3 14
While this Article generally favors technocratic decision-
making by a techno-bureaucratic elite, that system poses dangers.
On average, a higher proportion of non-Hispanic whites and
Asians receive college degrees, especially Ph.D.s in the sciences
and engineering, than Hispanics or African-Americans. In addi-
tion, women hold only about 2% of American physics Ph.D.s.315
There have been attempts to increase the number of minority
Ph.D.s in the sciences and engineering, but progress has been
slow, 1 6 and it may be more difficult to attract minorities in light
314 See Cross, Perceived Risk, supra note 197, at 68 (arguing science plays
"the important political function... in the modem liberal-democratic state" of
combatting "the ability of empowered elites to command action based on arbi-
trary or self-serving motives .... ).
315 For persons ages 25 to 29 in 1992, the proportions with bachelor degrees
were 26.7% for whites, 10.6% for blacks, and 11.4% for Latinos. RICHARD J.
HER sRsEm & CHARLES MURAY, THE BE.L CURvE: IrNEjuGENCE A
CLAss STRUCTURE IN Ai mRcA_ LFE 729 n.5 (1994). Women hold only about
2% of the 30,000 American physics Ph.D.s. Dale R. Corson, The United States
Has No Adequate Mechanism to Set Long-Range Research Policy, in ScIEcE
Am TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND JUDICIARY 97
(William T. Golden ed., 2d ed. 2d prtg. 1995). In 1992, blacks received 31 engi-
neering and 86 life sciences doctorates, while Asian-Americans obtained 213
and 175 degrees respectively and whites 1,744 and 4,210. Rhonda Reynolds,
Doctorates Up... But to What Degree?, BLACK ENTEmRisE, June 1994, at 40.
According to the 1990 census, blacks made up 12.1% of the population, but
only 1.9% of employed Ph.D. scientists and engineers in 1991; Hispanics com-
prised about 9% of the population, but only 1.6% of the Ph.D. workforce; and
Native Americans earned only 02% of such degrees, even though they consti-
tuted 0.8% of the general population. Elizabeth Culotta & Karen Fox, Trying
to Change the Face of Science, 262 Sci. 1089 (Nov. 12, 1993). By contrast,
Asian-Americans comprised 2.9% of the general population, but 6.9% of Ph.D.
scientists and engineers. Id. In addition, 60% of engineering Ph.D.s, 50% of
math Ph.D.s and almost one-third of life sciences Ph.D.s go to foreigners, espe-
cially Asians from China, India, Taiwan, Korea, and developing nations on the
Pacific Rim. Constance Holden, Foreign Nationals Change the Face of U.S. Sci-
ence, 261 Sci. 1769 (Sept. 24, 1993).
316 Culotta & Fox, supra note 315, at 1089 (noting that in 1992, blacks earned
only about 40 more science and engineering doctorates than they did in 1975);
Reynolds, supra note 315, at 40 (noting in 1992, blacks received 31 engineering
and 86 life sciences doctorates compared to only 9 engineering and 69 life sci-
ences Ph.D.s in 1982).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
1996]
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
of cutbacks in the sciences following the end of the Cold War.3 17
Thus, Hispanics and African-Americans are likely to be under-
represented on any elite scientific and bureaucratic council un-
less affirmative steps are taken to increase their representation,
but continuation of affirmative action programs is likely to be a
contentious political issue in the 1996 elections.318 The political
strength of large minority groups, however, is likely to ensure
that their views are heard, if not always followed, even if they are
statistically underrepresented on the staff of the Superagency.3 19
In any case, the Superagency should take special care to include
the views of both underrepresented minorities and poorly organ-
ized majorities.
It is possible to imagine scenarios in which elite groups, in-
cluding scientists and bureaucrats, act in their own self-interest
against the majority.3 20 This Article contends that the profes-
sional norms of the proposed techno-bureaucratic elite in combi-
nation with provisions for enhancing democratic dialogue will
improve the quality of decisionmaking for Americans of all col-
ors and income strata.
E. Will it Work?: A Global Warming Example
A fundamental issue is whether administrative agencies can
actually make sound decision's about long-term environmental
problems. Many commentators have argued that there are too
many uncertainties about complex environmental issues and not
317 Sharon Begley, No Ph.D.s Need Apply, NEwswEEK, Dec. 5, 1994, at 62
(tracing downsizing in the defense and pharmaceutical industries which has led
to rising rates of unemployment among scientists, especially for new Ph.D.
graduates); Malc6me W. Browne, Math and Science Not What They Used to Be,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 27, 1994, at F03 ("[J]ob cutbacks will especially hurt
women and members of minorities who have long been underrepresented in the
classroom and the laboratory.").
318 See generally John Haiwood, Center Stage: Racially Tinged Issues Domi-
nate the Debate As Campaigns Unfold, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at Al, A6
(predicting that racial issues such as affirmative action are likely to figure prom-
inently in 1996 elections).
319 Minority groups in a democracy by definition do not usually have the
same political strength as the majority, but that does not mean they have no
voice or influence. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
320 See, eg., HERRNSTEMIN & MuRRAY, supra note 315, at 523-26 (suggesting
the possibility that in the near future cognitive and financial elites in America
might create an authoritarian custodial state in which members of the under-
class, mainly the poor and uneducated, will have few rights and will be herded
into high-tech versions of Native American reservations).
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enough reliable scientific information for agencies to make better
decisions than the general public.321 Agencies have made serious
mistakes in the past,3  and therefore there is more reason to be-
lieve they will be wrong in predicting events twenty-five or fifty
years from now.323 On the other hand, there is an argument that
society's ability to extrapolate into the future is improving as sci-
entific knowledge grows and our ability to create computer mod-
els of various future scenarios develops.324
If we reject long-range planning because it will often be
wrong, the alternative is to do nothing, which may result in a
sizeable number of fatalities that could have been avoided in a
cost-effective manner.
There is strong evidence that atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases will greatly increase
during the next century unless emissions are reduced below cur-
rent levels.32 The impact of these increasing concentrations on
321 See Applegate, supra note 110, at 298-99,299-304 (discussing the informa-
tional critique, which questions the practical ability of an agency to apply its
expertise); Heinzerling, supra note 28, at 461-68 (arguing that Breyer uncriti-
cally accepts studies that favor his conclusions while criticizing studies using the
same methodology that suggest the need for greater regulation).
322 See generally Applegate, supra note 110, at 303-04 (discussing the histori-
cal critique of technocratic decisionmaking, which observes that New Deal-type
agency decisionmaking does not always produce effective or efficient
regulation).
32 For example, the pessimistic predictions in the Club of Rome study, that
argued for significant restraints on economic growth, have not yet been borne
out, although they may be in the next century. See THE Lirrs To Gao~vnT
(Dennis Meadows ed. 1972) (detailing Club of Rome study); BAiLEY, supra
note 311, at 138 (noting Club of Rome prediction that the world's oil supplies
would be depleted by the 1990s proved to be wrong and led to wasteful govern-
ment subsidies for synthetic fuels); Geza Feketekuty, The Link Between Trade
and Environmental Policy, 2 MawN. J. GLOBAL TADE 171,177 (1993) (arguing
that the anti-growth pessimism of the Club of Rome is wrong and that an in-
crease in the global economic output has a benefit for the environment).
324 See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 70.
325 See INTERGOVEJMIEMNTAL PANEL ON CUMITE CHANGE, CUrATE
CHANGE 1994 13 (1995). Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in
about 1800, the amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide in the
atmosphere have been increasing. See Dmxy LEE RAY ET AL., TRAstuNG THE
PLANEr 32-34 (1990); Robert C. Bailing., Jr., Global Warming: Messy Modes,
Decent Data, and Pointless Policy, in THE TRUE STATE aF THE PLANEr 85-S7
(Ronald Bailey ed., 1995). These increases are caused, among other things, by
fossil fuel burning, which increases carbon dioxide and nitrous oide concentra-
tions; rice paddy agriculture, which increases methane; deforestation, which
eliminates trees that recycle carbon dioxide into oxygen; and the use of some
fertilizers, which increases nitrous oxides. Id. at 86.
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global mean temperatures involves numerous complex factors.326
Many scientists believe that there will be significant global warm-
ing during the next century and some predict catastrophic conse-
quences such as the melting of polar ice caps.3 27 There is growing
evidence that-average global temperatures will inevitably rise be-
tween one and 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit during the next century
and that if no action is taken, average temperatures could rise
between 1.44 and 6.3 degrees3 28 After the year 2100, there
326 The issue of global warming is complex because there has been significant
natural variation over the centuries in the level of greenhouse gases, in the
Earth's climate, in the amount of volcanic dust in the air, and in solar radiation
and sunspot activity. See generally RAY, supra note 325, at 33-35, 39-41; Bal-
ling, supra note 325, at 87-95; Jerry Bishop, Long Ignored Cycle in Climate Sug-
gests Worse Greenhouse Effect Than Thought, WALL ST. J., April 11, 1995, at
B5. An increase in the amount of greenhouse gases does not automatically
increase the Earth's temperature, possibly because of countervailing influences
such as oceanic absorption of carbon dioxide as sea temperatures increase, in-
creased plant growth that in turn leads to greater removal of carbon dioxide, or
increased low-level cloud cover that may result in greater reflection of solar
radiation. See RAY, supra note 325, at 35; Balling, supra note 325, at 87-95.
327 See Jose L. Fernandez, Global Warming Legislation: Putting the Carbon
Genie Back In the Bottle, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1095, 1097 (1991) (citation
omitted) (majority of scientists believe increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases will result in significant global temperature increases and eventually will
melt the polar ice caps); Sall Patel, Comment, Reducing Carbon Dioxide Em is-
sions to 1990 Levels By the Year 2000. What Are the Options and Can the United
States Achieve this Reduction Without Disrupting the Economy, 3 DIcK. 3.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 79, 80 (1993) (300 leading climate scientists estimate global
temperatures will rise between three to five degrees centigrade by 2100); Wil-
liam K. Stevens, Global Warming Experts Call Human Role Likely, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 10, 1995, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Stevens, Global Warming] (noting draft sec-
tions of new report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change find
growing evidence to support view that human activities are at least partially
responsible for global warming); William K. Stevens, Scientists Say Earth's
Warming Could Set Off Wide Disruptions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, A5
[hereinafter Stevens, Scientists Say] (reporting on draft sections of new report
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggest significant eco-
nomic, social, and environmental dislocation from global warming); Introduc-
tion, in THE IMeAcr OF GLOBAL WARMING ON TEXAS (Gerald R. North et al,
eds., 1995) (noting global temperatures are likely to rise between two and three
degrees centigrade during next century). But see BAILEY, supra note 311 at 141-
67 (arguing many scientists believe that global temperatures during the 21st
century will rise by between a negligible amount to 1 degree centigrade; even
many of those who fear significant global warming will take place have lowered
their warming estimates); Balling, supra note 325, at 84-103 (arguing scientific
evidence is against the existence of a greenhouse crisis).
328 See Stevens, Global Warming, supra note 327, at 1 (reporting findings of
draft summary of new report by the IPCC).
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would be further increases in temperature, perhaps fifty to sev-
enty percent more than what took place by 2100.329
In 1992, despite the controversies about global warming,
twenty-four industrialized nations attending the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro
signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which es-
tablished the goal of stabilizing emissions of greenhouse gases at
their 1990 levels by the year 2000;330 however, it is now clear that
most will fail to meet that target. 31 In addition, the Convention
had only limited application to developing nations, whose use of
fossil fuels is rapidly increasing,332 and did not address what
should be done after the year 2000 33 By 1995, the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change,33 set up jointly by the United
329 Stevens, Scientists Say, supra note 327, at A5.
330 See Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, 31 LL.M. 849; see generally Elizabeth
P. Barratt-Brown et al., A Forum for Action on Global Warming: The UN
Framework on Climate Change, 4 CoLo. J. INT'L ENv-. L. & Poi'y 103
(1993); Donald M. Goldberg, Negotiating the Framewvork Convention on Cli-
mate Change, 4 TouRo J. TRAXSNAT'L L. 149 (1993); Marian Nash Leich,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 87 AM. J. INT'L L
103 (1993); Martin J. LaLnde, The Role of Risk Analysis in the 1992 Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L 215 (1993). Many
environmentalists were critical, however, of the Convention's failure to set
binding targets and deadlines, and blamed the Bush Administration for weak-
ening its provisions. See generally Barratt-Brown, supra note 330, (criticizing
lack of firm deadlines in Climate Convention and blaming Bush
Administration).
331 See Frank Bajak, Top Climatologists Sound New Alarms on Global Warm-
ing, Hous. PosT, Apr. 9,1995 at A28; Charles Petit, C02 Emissions Fuel Deep
Concern, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 1995, at A6.
332 Developing nations argued that it would be unfair for industrialized coun-
tries to impose heavy restrictions on the use of fossil fuels by developing nations
when developed nations consumed most of these fuels and such restrictions
would hinder the ability of developing nations to join the developed world. See
William K. Stevens, Climate Talks Enter Harder Phase of Cutting Back Emis-
sions, N.Y. Tmms, Apr. 11, 1995, at C4. As a result, developing nations insisted
that developed nations provide financial assistance to help them compile data
on their greenhouse emissions and to conduct energy planning. See Barratt-
Brown et al., supra note 330, at 112-13; Developing nations have refused to
have specific emission targets apply to them, although they have opened the
door to discuss more explicit measures after 1997. See Stevens, supra, at C4; see
also Petit, supra note 331, at A6 (discussing failure of 1992 Convention to ad-
dress growing emissions of developing countries).
333 See Barratt-Brown et al, supra note 330, at 111 ("It is unclear whether
4(2)(a) and (b) taken together would require emissions to remain at 1990 levels
after the year 2000.").
334 See G.O.P. Obasi & Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Foreward to IPCC, CMIATE
CHANGE 1994, supra note 325, at vii (discussing history of the IPCC).
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Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological
Organization, had determined that only drastic reductions in
greenhouse emissions could prevent a buildup of these gases and
pieliminarily recommended that global carbon dioxide emissions
be stabilized at sixty percent of their 1990 level by the year
2100. 3 5 In the spring of 1995, nearly 120 nations met in Berlin
and agreed to hold more meetings about setting goals beyond the
year 2000.
William Nordhaus, an economics professor at Yale Univer-
sity, has created a model that examines the effect of seven differ-
ent strategies for controlling greenhouse gases on world output
and consumption. He found that until the middle of the twenty-
first century there will be little difference between a policy of no
controls and one of optimal internalization, perhaps through a
carbon tax, but that by the year 2100, the optimal strategy would
increase annual output by $200 billion in 1989 prices compared to
no controls.336 Nordhaus's model suggests that society should
think about how our consumption will affect peoples' lives in the
year 2100. To optimize the level of reductions in greenhouse
335 See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1994, supra note 325, at 13 (reporting at-
mospheric levels of carbon dioxide will substantially increase during next cen-
tury unless there are significant reductions in emissions); Bajak, supra note 331,
at A28; Mark Jaffe, Global Warning: Scientists Now Say the 1992 Earth Summit
Treaty Wasn't Enough, PHIL. INQUIRER, Mar. 6, 1995, at GI. The Panel's draft
report is currently being reviewed by scores of scientists.
336 See WILLIAM D. NoRDHAus, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: TimE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 79-97 (1994) (analyzing seven approaches to
climate change policy: (1) no controls; (2) optimal policy; (3) ten-year delay of
optimal policy; (4) stabilizing emissions at 1990 rates; (5) 20% emissions reduc-
tion from 1990 levels; (6) geoengineering; and (7) climate stabilization).
Nordhaus' model does take into account economic growth, warming, and dam-
ages beyond 2100. Id. at 83. Nordhaus found that stabilizing greenhouse gases
at 1990 levels would reduce output by $3 trillion and that stabilizing climate
would cost even more, $7 billion dollars. Id. at 86. Nordhaus' model is based
upon a relatively high discount rate, albeit lower than OMB's; using a lower
discount rate would argue for more restrictive climate-change policies. See id.
at 122-35 (arguing for a real discount rate that begins around si'x percent per
annum and then declines to about three percent as growth slows, and contend-
ing use of lower discount rate is contrary to both theory and empirical data).
Because of the uncertainties about global warming, Nordhaus uses Monte Carlo
and decision analysis to examine different scenarios and "suggests that a carbon
tax may be a more efficient instrument in light of the enormous uncertainties"
than quantity restrictions, the optimal level of which varies greatly depending
upon informational assumptions. Id¢ at 184. Because the total amount of green-
house gases will grow even if we cap emissions at 80% of 1990 levels, an ap-
proach that Nordhaus believes is probably too costly, society will likely have to
adapt to significant increases in global temperatures by 2100. Id. at 86-90, 189.
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emissions during the next century will require comprehensive
planning and a series of coordinated policy changes over an ex-
tended period. The Superagency could revise its estimates of
warming and its planned responses if new research demonstrates
that the problem is less serious than many currently believe.
Despite Vice President Gore's view that global warming is
"the world's most important environmental threat,"33 7 President
Clinton is relying upon a plan based overwhelmingly upon volun-
tary measures by industry and EPA's Green Lights energy effi-
cient lighting program.338 EPA and the Department of Energy
are spending relatively small amounts of money on energy con-
servation and efficiency programs as a means to reduce green-
house gases.339 EPA Administrator Carol Browner has conceded
that these modest measures are inadequate to stabilize emissions
in the long term, and has called for broader research into new
technologies and continued research into nuclear safety and
waste disposal options that could maintain the option of com-
mercial nuclear power340
A Superagency potentially could do more to address the
problem of global warming than any single agency. First, the
Superagency would have greater independence and therefore
could resist political pressure to do either too much or too little.
At the same time, the rotation of Superagency staff among the
executive branch and congressional committees would help the
Superagency gauge whether it was politically feasible to propose
a carbon tax, which would almost certainly lead to opposition
from fossil fuel producers.
Second, the Superagency could expend greater resources on
developing better and more complete computer models of global
337 Climate Change: Global Warming Top Environment Threat, Warrants Co.
operative Effort, Gore Says, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) 77, at dli (Apr. 22,
1994) (quoting from speech by Vice President Gore at White House Confer-
ence on Climate Change).
338 Id; Air Pollution: Clinton Action, Plan Seeks Voluntary Industry Partici-
pation, Investment, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1178 (Oct. 22,1993) [hereinafter Clin-
ton Action Plan].
339 Clinton Action Plan, supra note 338, at 1178 (noting that EPA is request-
ing about $70 million and the Department of Energy a little over $200 million
for energy conservation and efficiency programs designed to reduce greenhouse
gases).
340 Clinton Action Plan, supra note 338, at 1178.
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warming than exist today.341 Existing governmental agencies and
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are already
conducting such research, but the Superagency could coordinate
it, possibly obtain greater funding and then conduct a public in-
formation campaign to win the support of the President, Con-
gress, and the general public. The Surgeon General performs a
similar public information function in conveying the fruits of
medical research about smoking or AIDS to the public and the
political branches.
Third, the Superagency would have a broader perspective
than current agencies or independent regulatory commissions
and could formulate more comprehensive strategies to prevent
or adapt to climatic changes. It could decide to what extent re-
newable energy sources or electric cars should be promoted to
avoid global warming problems or long-term shortages of fossil
fuels,342 decide whether or not to encourage the use of nuclear
power to reduce our consumption of fossil fuels.343 and plan
which mixture of renewable, fossil, and nuclear energy best ad-
dresses our energy needs and minimizes damages to the
environment.
In the short term, drastic reductions in carbon dioxide emis-
sions would require unrealistic changes in consumption and life-
style, and therefore, some amount of global warming over the
next decades is probably unavoidable.344 Accordingly, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences has recommended adaptation to, in
341 Until recently, computer models attempting to assess global warming
have been fairly simplistic and unable to predict actual temperature increases in
the Earth's atmosphere, but the most recent models used by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change are much better. See generally Stevens,
Global Warming, supra note 327, at 6 (noting that while previous computer
models of global warming had serious problems, the most recent models seem
to be more accurate).
342 See Bill McKibben, Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 23, 1995, at
24-25 (arguing we must drastically reduce our use of fossil fuels and use of elec-
tric cars to avoid greenhouse catastrophe). But see RAY, supra note 325, at 127-
33 (arguing solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources are impractical in
the near future as a substitute for conventional or nuclear power); Lester Lave
et al., Environmental Implications of Electric Cars, 268 Sci. 993, 994-95 (1995)
(arguing that electric cars pose serious environmental problems due to lead-
acid batteries).
343 See RAY, supra note 325, at 42, 123-41 (arguing that government should
encourage use of nuclear energy).
344 See NoRnHus, supra note 336, at 86-90, 189; Balling, supra note 325, at
101-03 (believing realistic measures are likely to have minimal impact on global
warming).
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addition to prevention of, climate change s45 The Superagency
could study how farmers might adapt to climate change, 46 or the
relocation of people from coastal areas, if the predictions of
some that global warming will result in partial melting of the po-
lar ice caps prove to be accurate3 47
Existing agencies could perform the same research or plan-
ning functions as the proposed Superagency, but, as Part IV
demonstrated, agencies currently do not spend enough resources
on long-term anticipatory planning, they ofteri lack specific statu-
tory authority to reallocate priorities, and there are insufficient
institutional or statutory mechanisms to encourage interagency
coordination and planning.348 It is impossible to prove ex ante
that the Superagency's staff would perform more competently
than EPA's,349 but there is the potential for improved perform-
ance if they take advantage of the benefits of rotating among dif-
ferent executive agencies and congressional committees, the
availability of greater resources, the intellectual freedom result-
ing from greater independence, and the ideological mission of
protecting future generations.
Because many long-range environmental problems are inter-
national in scope, we need to develop international institutions
and treaties that can effectively address them.35 0 The alternative
345 See Coum-- ON SCENCE ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POUCY, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL WAMI.NG
76-78 (1991); NoRDHAus, supra note 336, at 189. But see Herman E. Daly, Eco-
logical Economics, 254 Sci. 358 (1991).
346 See generally Harry L Kaiser et al., Adaptation to Global Climate Change
at the Farm Level, in AGRICULTURAL DmImNS[ONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
dHANGE 136-51 (Harry M. Kaiser & Thomas E. Drennen eds., 1993) (discussing
potential impacts of climate change on farmers in Nebraska and Minnesota).
347 But see BAILEY, supra note 311, at 149-50 (stating concerns that global
warming will result in the melting of the polar ice caps are contradicted by
recent evidence of polar cooling).
34S See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text.
349 See Finkel, supra note 255, at 357 (arguing that Breyer fails to establish
that his civil service elite would perform more effectively than EPA's staff).
350 See generally WEiss, supra note 1, at 289-91; Ben Boer, Institutionalizing
Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of National, State and Local
Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 31 Wt.L.IE-rE L
REv. 307 (1995); Fernandez, supra note 327, at 1102 (discussing how interna-
tional law might address problem of global warming); Mary Pat Williams
Silveira, International Legal Instruments and Sustainable Development: Princi-
ples, Requirements, and Restructuring, 31 WILH imrr L REv. 239 (1995).
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may be unilateral international coercion by some states to pre-
vent others from creating irreversible environmental harm.351
CONCLUSION
A comparative institutional analysis suggests that executive
or independent agencies are the most capable of conducting an-
ticipatory research and long-term planning. White House institu-
tions lack sufficient staff to match the capabilities of agencies and
are more vulnerable to changes in presidential administrations
than executive agencies. Despite Shifrin's proposal, the frag-
mented committee structure of Congress makes it ill-suited to
conduct long-range planning. Even in the 'unlikely event that
courts gave public interest groups standing to represent future
generations, courts could do little to address long-term environ-
mental problems without depending upon the research and plan-
ning efforts of the executive branch. While agencies are probably
the best institutions to perform long-term research and planning,
much needs to be done to improve their capabilities in terms of
increasing funding and improving coordination of efforts among
agencies.
The superior technical expertise'of agencies at long-term is-
sues is not enough to justify giving them carte blanche control
over the future. Depending upon their institutional framework,
the training of their staff, and their relationship to the political
branches, agencies can foster the "republican" political virtues of
public deliberation and participation. By educating the public,
Congress, and the Executive Office of the President about how
our behavior may affect the future, agencies could improve the
depth of public discussion about such issues as global warming
and increase the number of persons who participate in rulemak-
ing or public hearings on these matters. There are dangers from
excessive bureaucratic isolation, elitism, or self-interest, but these
can be managed if the political branches provide the ultimate
leadership.
At the very least, Congress should strengthen NEPA and
other environmental statutes to require EPA and other govern-
ment agencies to consider the impact of proposed regulations or
projects over the next one hundred years. The danger is that
351 See generally Owen Donald Jones, The Box H Problem: A Justification
for Unilateral International Coercion, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 209 (1990); Christen-
son, supra note 2, at 396.
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agencies might perform a relatively perfunctory analysis both be-
cause of budget limitations and the press of short-term issues.
There are a number of intermediate steps Congress or the
President could take short of creating a full-fledged Superagency.
First, Congress or the President could strengthen scientific envi-
ronmental policymaking within the executive branch by increas-
ing the scientific staff within OMB, increasing funding and
staffing for the Council on Environmental Quality, or giving the
Office of Science and Technology a greater role in environmental
planning and research. Second, Congress and the President
could increase EPA's research and planning budget, and give the
agency greater statutory authority to reallocate resources from
lower to higher risk issues. Third, Congress and the President
could establish an environmental research center that would
have purely a research and advisory role in long-term plan-
ning& -52 Such a research center might be less vulnerable to polit-
ical influence than the proposed Superagency, but would have no
authority to effect changes. Fourth, Congress might create a gen-
eral committee or permanent staff to oversee regulatory issues.
Finally, Congress could create a Superagency that can per-
form long-range planning and research on the future conse-
quences of environmental policies, review proposed agency
regulations, reallocate agency resources to higher priority issues,
and coordinate the work of overlapping agencies. The Super-
agency would need to have a significant degree of political inde-
pendence to protect future generations, but it would also have to
be actively involved with the political branches to be successful.
Because none of the three branches of government is well-suited
to address long-term problems, the Sup'eragency would have at
least limited authority to act in a countermajoritarian or pater-
nalistic fashion to protect future generations. In a democratic so-
ciety, however, the Superagency would eventually have to win
over the political branches to function successfully and should
take into account public values when formulating its policies.
Providing the Superagency with the independence it needs
depends upon creating a political culture that recognizes the
value of protecting future generations and long-term technocratic
352 See generally Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and The Failure of Legisla-
tive Methodology, 62 U. CN. L. REv. 1281, 1371-75 (1994)(proposing the crea-
tion of Office of Public Policy within Congress to identify issues and alternative
solutions).
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planning. The Superagency could not simply make decisions
without consulting the public, but would have to engage in an
educational campaign to show the general public how present de-
cisions often have long-term consequences. Thus, the creation of
an elitist institution to address long-term environmental
problems would probably increase public interest and participa-
tion regarding these issues rather than diminish citizen activism.
In addition, the circulation of its staff among Congress and the
executive branch, including the White House, would hopefully
.provide the Superagency with the political connections and savvy
to achieve its mission, and make it more sensitive to popular
values.
To create an 6ffective institution for long-term planning, so-
ciety must strike a balance between providing the institution with
sufficient incentives to perform its mission and at the same time
guard against creating a bureaucracy that exists to serve its own
needs. To prevent the Superagency from predicting long-rahge
disasters in order to bolster its budget, the Superagency might
manage the research of other agencies and universities. These
institutions themselves can lobby for 'more funding, but the
Superagency would have less incentive to sponsor unnecessary
research if its budget did not depend upon particular research
results.
The proposed Superagency represents an ideal model for
conducting long-term environmental research and planning. It
may be impractical today to create a Superagency, but existing
agencies could adopt some of the proposed reforms such as rotat-
ing employees or increasing funding for long-term projects. Most
of all, government agencies should encourage the public to think
about the consequences of their actions upon future generations.
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